A Comparison
between the Security Strategies of USA and EU
Thesis
“Master of Advanced International Studies” (M.A.I.S.)
Diplomatic Academy of Vienna
1st
supervisor: Prof.Dr. Hanspeter Neuhold (International Politics)
2nd
supervisor: Prof.Dr. Anton Pelinka (Comparative Politics)
Vienna, 2004
CONTENTS
Contents (p.2), Credits (p.5), Introduction (p.6)
PART 1: The National Security Strategy of the United
States of America (p.8)
1.1. Historical
background (p.8)
1.2. Summary of
main contents (p.11)
Introduction (p.11)
Chapter I: Overview of America's International
Strategy (p.12)
Chapter II: Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity
(p.12)
Chapter III: Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global
Terrorism and Work
to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends (p.13)
Chapter IV: Work with others to Defuse Regional
Conflicts (p.14)
Chapter V: Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us,
Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction (p.14)
Chapter VI: Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth
through free Markets and Free Trade (p.16)
Chapter VII: Expand the Circle of Development by
Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy (p.16)
Chapter IX: Transform America's National Security
Institution to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First
Century (p.17)
1.3. Comments on core
elements (p.18)
1.3.1. USA - omnipotent and powerless (p.18)
1.3.2. A new world order: the end of the Cold War;
universal values; global engagement (p.19)
1.3.3. Assessment of threats: terrorism, rogue states,
weapons of mass destruction (p.21)
1.3.4. "Multilateralism à la carte" (p.22)
1.3.5. The doctrine of prevention / preemption (p.24)
Part 2: "A Secure Europe in a Better World"
- The European Security Strategy (p.28)
2.1. Historical
background (p.28)
2.2. Summary of
main contents (p.30)
Introduction (p.30)
Chapter I: The Security Environment: Global Challenges
and Key Threats (p.30)
·
Global Challenges
(p.30)
·
Key Threats (p.31)
Chapter II: Strategic Objectives (p.31)
·
Addressing the
threats (p.31)
·
Building Security
in Our Neighbourhood (p.31)
·
An International
Order Based on Effective Multilateralism (p.32)
Chapter III: Policy Implications for Europe (p.32)
·
More Active (p.32)
·
More Capable (p.33)
·
More Coherent
(p.33)
·
Working with
partners (p.34)
2.3. Comments on core
elements (p.34)
2.3.1. Lack of political will (p.34)
2.3.2. EU's war on terrorism - achievements and
failures (p.35)
2.3.3. Lack of military capabilities (p.37)
Part 3: On the Future of Transatlantic Relations - a
Comparison between the two Documents (p.41)
3.1. Theoretical
background: the transatlantic relationship (p.41)
3.1.1. Transatlantic relationship endangered? (p.41)
3.1.2. Why did the differences occur? Three
theoretical approaches (p.44)
3.1.2.1. Realism (p.44)
3.1.2.2. Constructivism (p.47)
3.1.2.3. Liberalism (p.49)
3.2. Comparison of
texts (p.50)
3.2.1. Size and quality (p.50)
3.2.2. Self-confidence (p.53)
3.2.3. Assessment of threats (p.54)
3.2.4. Fight against HIV / AIDS (p.55)
3.2.5. Transatlantic relations (p.58)
3.2.6. International Criminal Court (ICC) (p.60)
3.3. Summary of the
Thesis / Conclusion (p.62)
Literature (p.65)
America applauds
those who fight for liberty and independence, "but she goes not abroad, in
search of monsters to destroy...The fundamental maxims of her policy would
insensibly change from liberty to force. She might become the dictatress
of the world. She would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit."
John Quincy Adams, 2nd president of the United States of
America, 1821
"Just three
days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of
history. But our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these
attacks and rid the world of evil."
George Walker Bush, 43rd president of the United States of
America, 2001
* * *
Credits
I would like to
thank all those who have helped me with my academic work, especially the
following persons:
·
...Prof.Hanspeter Neuhold and Prof.Anton Pelinka for acting as my
supervisors. I could profit a lot from their experience and academic advice.
·
...Prof.Werner Neudeck, dean of students, for
the coordination of our programme.
·
...my charming
colleagues Hanna Lauren (Finland) and
Monika Milewski (Austria) for acting
as the "active discussants" of my work during our Thesis Seminars,
thereby providing me with an input of precious ideas.
·
...our English
teacher Keith Chester and my dear
colleague Brad Klapper (USA) for the
correction of my truly "Austrian" English.
·
...Ambassador Ernst Sucharipa, director of the
Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, for his presentations on "Diplomacy in the
21st Century" and "Current Transatlantic Relations"
during our Interdisciplinary Seminars, which strongly influenced my writings.
·
...the team of the
Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, especially study director Elisabeth Hofer, deputy director Gerhard Reiweger and Ms.Ingrid
Eidler for their support during this study year.
Introduction
The objective of this thesis is to compare
two core documents of international relations: the National Security Strategy
of the United States of America (the "Bush doctrine") and the
European Security Strategy (the "Solana doctrine"). What do the
Security Strategies of the USA and the EU have in common, where are the main
differences? This topic ultimately leads to the question of the future of
transatlantic relations, which are currently suffering from major problems;
some authors even indicate that "the West is cracking" (Fukuyama).
Are America and Europe drifting apart? What does the comparison of the two
documents indicate, taking into consideration the relevant theoretical
background concerning transatlantic relations (realism, constructivism,
liberalism)?
The relevance of such an academic work is
clear:
First, the two
above-mentioned documents are very important statements on international
politics. Their analysis and comparison can be an important contribution to
political science.
Second,
transatlantic relations are crucial for the security environment we live in.
Their future is linked to the future of European and global security. An
assessment of their current status is therefore also important.
Third, despite some
recent publications[1] competent
academic comparisons between the two Security Strategies are still missing.
This thesis therefore might provide relevant and new results.
This thesis follows
an interdisciplinary approach by
taking into account two different political science disciplines. A distinct
analysis of the above-mentioned document ultimately leads to a discussion of
different security issues, ranging from U.S. relations with China to the
creation of European military capabilities. These problems are linked to the
discipline "International Politics". A comparison of two Security
Strategies, which outline different policies, belongs to the discipline of
"Comparative Politics". Such a comparison must also take into account
structural differences between the political systems and societies behind the
documents. One must, for instance, always take into account that the National
Security Strategy of the United States of America is the product of one
government, whereas the European Security Strategy is a compromise between a
greater number of governments. Such facts are mentioned throughout the text;
differences in cultures and society are especially dealt with in Part III in
the sections about the theoretical background of the transatlantic
relationship.
Finally, an
introduction should also provide a response to a legitimate, but misleading
question the author was confronted with while writing this work: what if George
W. Bush loses the next presidential elections and John F. Kerry wins? What will
then happen to this thesis? Will it be one more book for the shelf?
The correct
response to this question is that even then there is no reason to believe that
this thesis will be outdated. Authors like Robert Kagan rightly insist that the
current transatlantic problem is not a George W. Bush problem; there are
structural rather than personal reasons for it. The future of the "Bush
doctrine" is not certain under future administrations. However, throughout
history some doctrines have politically "survived" the presidents who
first announced them. The "Truman doctrine" of
"containment" was the first strategy a president developed to the new
security environment after 1945, which was marked by the emergence of the
"Cold War". The Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower originally opposed
the strategy of his Democrat predecessor. However, after being elected, he de
facto adopted the "Truman doctrine", which became the U.S. strategy
for the next fifty years. The same might happen to the "Bush
doctrine", which tries to provide a solution to the problems of the new
security environment after the end of the Cold War and the attacks of September
11, 2001. One day Bush will be no longer president. But it is very unlikely
that all elements of his strategy will disappear. The "Bush
doctrine", however problematic, might be here to stay.
PART 1: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
1.1. Historical
background
On September 20,
2002 U.S. president George W. Bush released his version of the "National
Security Strategy of the United States of America", which was then
submitted to the Congress and the public.[2]
Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, every U.S. president is
required to submit a national security report to the Congress. The United
States Code (USC) 404a states that the report must include an explanation of
the USA's vital interests, foreign policy commitments and defence capabilities.[3]
According to
Lombardi[4]
these reports serve two main purposes:
·
...providing an
overview of the administration's thinking on national security affairs, thereby
enabling predictability and transparency of U.S. foreign policy.
·
...providing the
Congress with relevant information about U.S. strategy, thereby helping this
assembly in the decision-making process concerning the funding of security
related executive responsibilities, such as the armed forces, intelligence
services, and the conduct of foreign relations.
Additionally, the
mere existence of a National Security Strategy can make an increasingly complex
foreign policy more efficient. A statement of clear, general guidelines,
objectives and principles can serve as a common basis for all efforts
undertaken by a highly diversified bureaucratic apparatus. Such a Strategic
Concept can therefore provide coherence.
Taking into account
the above mentioned legal basis, the publication of a National Security
Strategy is under normal circumstances a rather usual procedure, a mere
routine. The overwhelmingly negative media reaction to the submitted document
indicates that the circumstances were not usual at all and the whole procedure
was far from routine. Normally National Security Strategies tend to be ignored
by the public and the mass media.[5]
The public
attention can at least partly be explained by the fact that the National
Security Strategy was not only the first Security Strategy presented by the
Bush administration, but also the first one published after the tragic events
of September 11.[6]
The National
Security Committee (NSC) in Washington started working on the concept in spring
2002.[7]
It should be worth noting that the final result of September 2002 was not
submitted on time: According to the above mentioned provisions (USC 404a) the
concept must be delivered to the Congress no later than 150 days after the
president's inauguration. The delay was due to bureaucratic problems in the
preparatory work and the events of September 11, which made a completely new
approach necessary.[8]
It may be assumed
that National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice played a crucial role in
drafting the concept.[9]
The development of the National Security Strategy can be seen as an
evolutionary process, which was accompanied by intensive discussions within the
inner circle of advisors surrounding president George W. Bush.[10]
This evolutionary
pattern can be illustrated by George W. Bush's speeches within the time frame
of the development of the Strategic Concept. Three speeches, which strongly
influenced the final text are especially worth mentioning. They can be seen as
forerunners of the National Security Strategy and are partly quoted in the
document.
These speeches are:
·
State of the Union address (January 2002).[11]
Bush told Congress and the nation that the United States faced new threats, extending
beyond terrorist groups to rogue states. In this context he explicitly
mentioned Iran, Iraq and North Korea. Despite the fact that the political and
ideological systems of the three countries do not have much in common, he
declared: "States like this, and their terrorist allies, constitute an
axis of evil." In his speech he not only linked rogue states with the
phenomenon of terrorism, but also with weapons of mass destruction: "By
seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing
danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to
match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the
United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be
catastrophic." Then he announced that this trinity of evil (rogue states,
terrorism, weapons of mass destruction) could only be fought through active
engagement: "Time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while
dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The
United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to
threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons." It can be assumed
that these words were especially directed against Iraq's regime, which was
accused of possessing weapons of mass destruction by the U.S. administration:
weapons that have not yet been found.
·
Declaration to the German Bundestag (May 2002). In it Bush states that the shared beliefs and common
goals of the transatlantic relationship prevail over all differences.[12]
The text of this declaration was also partly integrated into the National
Security Strategy.
·
Commencement speech at West Point (June 2002).[13]
Calling for new thinking to match new threats, the commander-in-chief told a
new generation of soldiers that the old Cold War doctrines of deterrence and
containment were outdated. "Deterrence - the promise of massive
retaliation against nations - means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks
with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when
unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons
on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies." Bush also
mentioned what he later termed the "new doctrine called preemption"
by stating: "...the war on terror will not be won on the
defensive..." Instead, he proclaimed that "we must take the battle to
the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they
emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of
action. And this nation will act." Most chapters of the National Security
Strategy are headed by a quotation from this speech.
It must again be
stressed that the historical event that shaped the National Security Strategy
was the terrorist attack on September 11. The authors clearly had it in mind
when they developed their concept. The experience of vulnerability despite a
huge military and economic power potential has certainly shocked the American
people and their political elite.[14]
It has perhaps caused a trauma that has yet to be overcome. That does not mean
that September 11 has changed everything; some elements of the National
Security Strategy were formulated in a similar way by former administrations.[15]
But the shocking events have surely accelerated a process that already came
into being after the end of the Cold War.
1.2. Summary of
main contents
The objective of
this section is to paraphrase and to summarise the main contents of the
National Security Strategy. This information will serve as a basis for the next
section (1.3.), which contains critical comments on the core assumptions of the
document and general information on the current scientific discussion.
First a short
remark about structure and language of the document: the National Security
Strategy is a document of slightly more than 30 pages, which are divided in
nine small chapters. Additionally, it includes a table of contents and an
introduction of about three pages. This introduction is signed by George W.
Bush. It is written in plain English so that, as the president told his staff,
"the boys in Lubbock" could read and understand it.[16]
Introduction
The introduction
provides a kind of general summary of the contents of the National Security
Strategy. It contains basic assumptions (like the moral superiority of
democracy over other forms of government or the universality of the values the
USA is built upon) and the topics addresses later on (like the war against
terrorism, the relationship with other great powers such as China and Russia,
the fight against AIDS, the emphasis on free market economy etc.) the
importance of international cooperation is stressed, presumably as a response
to critics. "In keeping with our heritage and principles we do not press
for unilateral advantage....We are also guided by the conviction that no nation
can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions
can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations." The United States is
committed to multilateral institutions like UN, NATO etc., "coalitions of
the willing" can augment these permanent institutions. "In all cases,
international obligations are to be taken seriously. They are not to be
undertaken symbolically to rally support for an ideal without furthering its
attainment."
Chapter I: Overview of America's International
Strategy
The United States
of America will use its unprecedented and unequal strength and influence to
defend universal liberal values world-wide. A "balance of power that
favors freedom" must be created. The struggle between totalitarianism and
democracy is over. Today other threats are rising, such as radical terrorists.
The world's failing states are more dangerous for the USA than the powerful
ones. The U.S. strategy is based on "a distinctly American internationalism".
It is the United States' mission to "make the world not just safer but
better". In order to do so, the United States follows eight objectives
that serve as titles for the rest of the document's chapters.
Chapter II: Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity
The values the
United States stands for "are right and true for all people
everywhere". This is especially true for the right of education and
freedom from poverty, violence and political oppression. The demands of human
dignity, such as rule of law, religious freedom etc. are
"nonnegotiable". These values, which are in the case of the U.S.
enshrined in the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, were
historically successful, whereas the violation of these principles was not. America's
experience as a multiethnic society strengthens its conviction that
"people of many heritages and faiths can live and prosper in peace".
The world-wide trend of democratisation must be supported by the United States.
The U.S. will support this movement by using diplomatic means within
international institutions, by granting foreign aid, by making the development
of democratic institutions a key theme in bilateral relations, and by making
"special efforts" to promote religious freedom. The precise form of
these "efforts" is, however, not exactly defined. "We will
champion the cause of human dignity and oppose those who resist it."
Chapter III: Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global
Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends
The enemy of the
United States of America is terrorism, which is defined as "premeditated,
politically motivated violence against innocents". It has to be fought
globally. No cause justifies terrorism, not even "legitimate
grievances", which have to be addressed within a political process. There
will be no concessions to and deals with terrorists; there will be no
distinction drawn between terrorists and states who knowingly harbour and
provide aid to them. The war against global terrorism will last long and will
have to be fought on many fronts. The war in Afghanistan was the first
successful step in this direction; but still many terrorist cells remain on all
continents. Terrorist organisations must be destroyed by attacking and
disrupting their command, control, communications, material support and
finances.
In this fight,
"all the elements of national and international power" will be used.
"While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of
the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary,
to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such
terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our
country..." The USA will also wage a "war of ideas" against
international terrorism. All terrorism must be considered illegitimate and be
viewed in the same light as genocide, slavery etc., i.e. it is intolerable.
"Modern and moderate" Muslim countries should be supported. The
international community should be mobilised against the terrorist threat.
Public diplomacy
will serve as a tool to spread democratic beliefs and ideals. America's
homeland security must be strengthened "(w)hile we recognize that our best
defense is a good offense". In order to do so, the Bush Administration has
proposed the largest government reorganisation since the Truman Administration
created a National Security Council and a Department of Defence. Bush created
the Department of Homeland Security, a new unified military command and a
fundamental reordering of the FBI.
Emergency
management systems and medical systems will be strengthened in order to deal
with possible damages caused by biological or chemical weapons; border controls
will also be improved. This improvement will have positive side effects on
other fields. Afghanistan will be rebuilt together with the UN, NGOs and other
countries, "so that it will never again abuse its people, threaten its
neighbors, and provide a haven for terrorists".
Chapter IV: Work with others to Defuse Regional
Conflicts
"Concerned
nations" must remain actively engaged in regional conflicts - for
humanitarian purposes, but also in order to provide stability in an
interconnected world. The Unites States has finite political, economic and
military resources to meet their global priorities. The necessity of U.S.
engagement will be decided from case to case; the USA should invest in building
international relationships and institutions that can help manage local crises,
but it should also be realistic about its (limited) ability to help those who
are unwilling or unready to help themselves.
The
Israeli-Palestinian conflict deserves special attention: The close relationship
between the USA and Israel is mentioned, but there is also a commitment to an
independent and democratic Palestine. "If Palestinians embrace democracy,
and the rule of law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can
count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state."
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories must stop; permanent occupation
threaten Israel's identity and democracy. The USA will try to contribute to
these goals, but in the end Israelis and Palestinians must "resolve the
issues and end the conflict" by themselves.
In South Asia, the
USA emphasises the need for India and Pakistan to end their conflict; strong
bilateral relations have been and will be built up with both countries.
One main problem
that has to be countered in Latin America is the existence of drug cartels. For
example, Colombia suffers from problems caused by terrorist and extremist
groups an drug trafficking; therefore it must be helped. Africa's failing
states must be stabilised for humanitarian reasons, but also because they might
harbour terrorists. In its strategy for Africa, the USA will rely on
"anchors" like South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia,
"coalitions of the willing" and on the cooperation with European
allies.
Chapter V: Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us,
Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction
While deterrence
was the dominating strategy during the Cold War, the new security environment
has undergone drastic transformation. Some changes are positive, like the new
partnership with Russia that replaced former rivalry, but "new deadly
challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorism". Rogue states
fulfil the following vaguely defined criteria (it is not stated who will decide
if they apply): they brutalise their own people and squander their national
resources for the personal gain of the ruler; they display no regard for
international law, threaten their neighbours and violate treaties to which they
are party; they are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction; they
sponsor terrorism around the globe; they reject basic values and, finally,
"hate the United States and everything for which it stands". The
status of a "rogue state" is therefore explicitly dependant on a
certain policy towards the USA, which is therefore a kind of incarnation of
morality in international politics.
Iraq and North
Korea are explicitly mentioned as such rogue states. Surprisingly, Iran is not.
These rogue states must be stopped; but the main strategies of the Cold War
(deterrence and retaliation) do not promise to be successful "against
leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of
their people, and the wealth of their nations."
The alternative
strategy is "preemption": "The United States has long maintained
the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national
security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction - and the
more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves,
even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States
will, if necessary, act preemptively."
The National
Security Strategy also claims that this strategy is in accordance with
international law (an assumption that can be challenged[17]):
"For centuries,
international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they
can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an
imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often
conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat
- most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies and air forces preparing
to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and
objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to
attack us by using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail.
Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of
mass destruction - weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly,
and used without warning."
Chapter VI: Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth
through free Markets and Free Trade
The USA will
contribute to promoting global economic growth which will positively affect
U.S. economy. The "lessons of history" show that a market economy is
the best way to promote prosperity and reduce poverty. It must be backed by
measures that protect the health of the workers and the environment. The USA is
committed to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
Chapter VII: Expand the Circle of Development by
Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy
Poverty and unequal
distribution of wealth is one of the world's major problems. "Including
all of the world's poor in an expanding circle of development" is a moral
imperative and one of the top priorities of U.S. foreign policy.
The efficiency of
(traditional) development assistance is questioned. Nevertheless, an increase
of U.S. development aid by 50% is proposed. The World Bank has to become more
efficient.
The USA is ready to
spend more resources for the fight against HIV / AIDS. New technologies
(including biotechnologies) might reduce hunger and malnutrition.
Chapter VIII: Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action
with the Other Main Centers of Global Power
America will
organise and take over the leadership of coalitions. Cooperation with Canada
and European allies is crucial; therefore NATO and the EU, for whom the
National Security Strategy expresses its appreciation, play a significant role.
Some main demands for NATO reform are outlined, which should ensure its
functioning in the future under new conditions; here mobility and global
engagement seem to play a central role.
The following close
Asian allies in the war against terrorism are especially mentioned: Australia,
Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, New Zealand and the Philippines. The
rest of the chapter mainly deals with the U.S. relationship with Russia, India
and China.
Russia is no longer
a strategic adversary. Despite difficulties (like the distrust of Russian
elites of America's motives), much has been and will be done to improve the
U.S.-Russian-relationship (like the creation of a NATO-Russia Council, the
common alliance in the war against terrorism etc.). The USA supports Russia's
entry into the WTO without lowering standards for accessions. Russia's war in
Chechnya is not mentioned.
With India there
are differences concerning India's nuclear programme and economic reform. The
country has a huge potential and might become a major actor in the 21st
century as the world's largest democracy. It is an ally in the war against
terror.
The National
Security Strategy is not silent about the differences with China; it explicitly
mentions Taiwan and human rights policy. The "emerge(nce) of a strong,
peaceful and prosperous China" is welcomed. China's entry into the WTO
will provide an important stimulus for U.S. economy.
Chapter IX: Transform America's National Security
Institution to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First
Century
All institutions of
American national security must be reformed in order to meet the new
requirements. The essential role of American military strength must be
reaffirmed. The structure of the military forces must be adapted to the new
threats of a post-Cold War era. The intelligence community is "our first
line of defense against terrorists and the threat posed by hostile
states"; it must also learn how to deal with a more complex and elusive
set of targets instead of gathering information about a huge empire like the
Soviet Union. The authority of the director of CIA has to be strengthened. The
vital role of effective diplomacy is also reaffirmed. The International
Criminal Court (ICC) is rejected; U.S. nationals have to be "protected"
before its jurisdiction. Under the conditions of globalisation, the distinction
between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing. The USA is considered
extremely vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Finally, the National Security Strategy
expresses confidence that the war against terror can be won.
1.3. Comments on core
elements
1.3.1. The USA - omnipotent and powerless
The United States
of America can be described as both omnipotent and powerless; and the National Security
Strategy is perfectly aware of this dilemma.
On the one hand,
the United States is the world's "unprecedented superpower".[18]
It is sometimes even called an "unchallenged empire"[19],
or, in the well-known words of French foreign minister Védrine, a "hyper-puissance".
The American military is superior to all other armed forces in the world. Great
powers like China, India or Russia are at the moment too poor to build up a
similar power potential. Japan or a united Europe could, but they lack the political
will to do so. In addition, the U.S. economy and its technology are superior to
those of all other potential competitors.
George W. Bush
realised this when he wrote in his introduction to the National Security
Strategy: "Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled
military strength and great economic and political influence." It is made
clear by the National Security Strategy that the USA is determined to defend
this unique position and will not allow potential rivals to catch up. In Chapter
IX the document states: "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade
potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing,
or equaling, the power of the United States."
In the last
paragraph of the document the power assets of the USA are also explicitly
mentioned. All these judgements on America's current hegemonic position in the
world are correct. The USA is, as the world's only remaining superpower,
capable of performing military interventions in every region of the world.
Without the USA it is unlikely that any progress can be achieved in a number of
crisis areas, including the Middle East. From this perspective, the United
States seems to be nearly omnipotent.
On the other hand,
the United States suffers from "strategic vulnerability".[20]
One of the core problems of the current security environment is an alliance
between technology and extremism.[21]
Today it is easy for relatively small groups to cause major damage to the
structures of a society and kill vast numbers of people by using modern
technology. Radical elements have existed in all centuries. But today they are
much more dangerous than they used to be, because they have deadlier weapons at
their disposal. The United States as an open and highly diversified society with
its complicated economic structure is especially vulnerable to terrorist
attacks. It is very hard to prepare against or to foresee such attacks.
Terrorists come out of nowhere; they strike by surprise; they are prepared to
die and consequently can hardly be deterred by threats So the USA is, despite
all its power assets, in a way powerless in the face of new security problems.
1.3.2. A new world order; the end of the Cold War;
universal values; global engagement
In the view of some
experts, the National Security Strategy has the potential of becoming a
"milestone" of U.S. foreign policy.[22]
Its historical relevance partly lies in the fact that it offers a new strategy
for the new world order of the 21st century. It overcomes the strategic
concepts of the Cold War.[23]
The National
Security Strategy provides a mixture of "realistic" and
"idealistic" elements.[24]
On the one hand, to deal with "realism" first, the U.S. is perfectly
aware of its own power assets, on which it relies. There are of course
non-military elements in the document which tend to be overseen by critics.[25]
Nevertheless, the emphasis on military power is strong.
On the other hand,
there is also a strong emphasis on rather "idealistic", liberal
values: human rights, freedom, justice etc. These values are not considered
purely American, but universal. Consequently, they have to be defended in a
global context.
"The great
struggle of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended
with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom - and a single sustainable
model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. In the
twenty-first century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic
human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to
unleash the potential of their people and assure their future prosperity.
People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them;
worship as they please; educate their children - male and female; own property;
and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are right and
true for every person, in every society - and the duty of protecting these
values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people
across the globe and across the ages."[26]
The philosophy of
history underlying the National Security Strategy sometimes reminds many
scholars of the writings of Francis Fukuyama ("End of History").[27]
Fukuyama claims that humanity entered a final stage of history with the globalisation
of the market economy and democratisation. The war between ideologies such as
democracy, fascism and communism is over, because democracy has proven its
superiority. What is necessary now is the preservation and further spread of
this superior model to the world.
"The U.S.
national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American
internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national
interest. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but
better."[28]
This last quotation
illustrates the missionary character of the National Security Strategy. America
has to defend universal values, which are not only true and just for Americans,
but for everyone. Everyone who does not accept these values has to be fought -
not only in America, but everywhere around the globe.
This thesis neither
suggests that the above stated values are not universal, nor that they are not
morally superior to others. But two critical questions must be raised:
·
Can the conviction of
representing the forces of good in the world under certain circumstances turn
into a dangerous crusade, that can do harm to all the values it claims to
defend? The rhetoric of the "decision" George W. Bush offered to the
world in one of his speeches ("with us or against us"[29])
certainly breeds such fears.
·
Can a lack of
self-criticism cause unrealistic assumptions about the realities of world
politics? In one of his well-known quotes, U.S. president Bush honestly
wondered, how anyone could not like the USA despite the fact that "we are
so good". Some U.S. strategists also expected the Iraqi population to
warmly welcome American troops as the forces of freedom and were surprised
about the actual active and passive resistance. Should such a Manichaean world-view
serve as a basis for political action? Or should a more differentiated one
prevail?
1.3.3. Assessment of threats: terrorism, rogue states,
weapons of mass destruction
The National
Security Strategy mainly identifies two major threats for the future of the US
and the whole civilised world: terrorist networks and rogue states, which both
possibly acquire weapons of mass destruction.[30]
Together they might often form alliances, which must be destroyed.
Some authors judge
these threats as realistic[31],
others name specific examples where they have not been so realistic at all.
Before the new Gulf War, the USA claimed that there was an alliance between
Iraq and terrorist networks like Al Qaeda. Such claims lacked credence when
they were made - one should always keep in mind that Hussein was a
"secular" dictator whom many Islamic fundamentalists saw as their
enemy. But even today, after the war, there is no evidence that such an
alliance ever existed.[32]
In his State of the
Union address George W. Bush explicitly mentioned Iraq, North Korea and Iran as
being part of an "axis of evil". In the National Security Strategy,
Iraq and North Korea are referred to as rogue states, while Iran is not
mentioned. According to Lombardi a likely explanation "is that mention of Iran
was dropped to appease critics of the 'axis of evil' designation, including
many important allies. In other words, rogue states would appear to be a public
label subject to private political consideration."[33]
The objectivity of
the criteria for intervention is often questioned by critics.[34]
Might power politics or economic interest (for instance, access to oil
resources) also play a role in the assessment on who is a rogue state and who
is not? And even if the USA acted out of pure idealism, many problems would
still exist. What if its intelligence information about terrorist plans or the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction in another country is false? Under a
former administration a plant in Sudan that produced pharmaceutical drugs was
blown up because it was said to produce chemical weapons. What ought to be done
in order to prevent such failures? The National Security Strategy's objective
to "build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide
timely, accurate information on threats" remains a rather vague answer to
this question.
1.3.4. "Multilateralism à la carte"
The National
Security Strategy rests on knowledge about American military, economic and
political power and the clear will to use it in order to deal with security problems.
According to Ivo Daalder, president Bush is responsible for a
"revolution" in foreign policy. This revolution rests on the belief
that in a dangerous world the best if not only way to ensure America's security
is to shed the constraints imposed by friends, allies and international
institutions. Therefore one of the main goals of the new administration was
maximising America's freedom to act. George W. Bush therefore created something
like "America Unbound", as Daalder entitles his book on U.S. foreign
policy.[35]
The (mostly
negative) media reaction to the National Security Strategy was quite similar to
Daalder's assessment. The document was perceived as an assertion of American
unilateralism and a rejection of multilateral cooperation.
U.S. policy towards
Iraq seems to support such a view. The USA largely ignored criticism put
forward by allies like Germany or France, other great powers like Russia or
China or public opinion in the Arab world. The war was initiated despite the
fact that it did not enjoy the same kind of multilateral support as the Gulf
War waged by George W. Bush's father in 1991. Consequently the reaction to the
new Gulf War was the following: "Anger had swelled overseas at what was
seen as an arrogant and hypocritical America. Several close allies spoke openly
about how to constrain America rather than how best to work with it."[36]
U.S. secretary of
state Colin Powell tried to qualify such criticism from the mass media and
researchers. In an article in "Foreign Affairs" ("A Strategy of
Partnerships") he denies that U.S. strategy is unilateralist by design:
"Above all,
the president's strategy is one of partnerships that strongly affirms the vital
role of NATO and other U.S. alliances - including the UN."[37]
He tries to defend this
statement by pointing out the president's effort to include the United Nations
in the decision-making process concerning post-war Iraq. Additionally "we
tried for a further resolution to unite the international community in the
months before Operation Iraqi Freedom began"[38],
which is a proof for Powell that the US respects the UN to a great deal. Of
course the fact that the United States finally started the war without such a
Security Council resolution could also be interpreted as a lack of respect for
this institution.
Powell also
emphasises international cooperation in the development of a
"roadmap" for the Middle East conflict;[39]
he also mentions the priorities the National Security Strategy places in the
development of cooperative relations among world powers like China, Russia and
India. Finally, he also finds kind and warm words for the European partners:
"It is true
that we have had differences with some of our oldest and most valued NATO
allies. But these are differences among friends. The transatlantic partnership
is based so firmly on common interests and values that neither feuding
personalities nor occasionally divergent perceptions can derail it. We have new
friends and old friends alike in Europe. They are all, in the end, best
friends, which is why the president continues to talk about partnerships, not
polarities, when he speaks about Europe."[40]
These words most
likely represent Powell's honest convictions, but they are of course hard to
equate with Donald Rumsfeld's comparison between communist rogue states like
Cuba and allies like the Federal Republic of Germany. This raises another
critical question. Is the secretary of state's interpretation of the National
Security Strategy the same as the secretary of defence's one? And do President George
W. Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney interpret it similarly? Can the document
really be interpreted as a "Strategy of Partnerships"? Or is it just
an attempt to downplay the unilateral dimension of the strategy?
The statements of
the National Security Strategy and the policy of the United States indeed seem
to indicate a desire for multilateral cooperation. But this form of
multilateralism might best be described in the words of Richard Haass (head of
the planning staff in the State Departement) as "multilateralism à la
carte".[41] In such a
model, the United States seeks multilateral support for its own policy within
UN, NATO etc. If such a broad support cannot be found, the USA instead tries to
form, in the words of Bush's introduction to his Strategic Concept,
"coalitions of the willing" with at least some other countries. These
coalitions are more ad hoc than permanent alliances. In the unlikely case that
no such partners can be found the USA would under certain circumstances also
act alone, even against the will of its closest traditional allies, whose
influence on U.S. policy will in any case be limited, whether they follow the
leading nation or not. Such a concept of "multilateralism à la carte"
could be unilateralism in disguise.
1.3.5. The doctrine of prevention / preemption
The essence of the
National Security Strategy is chapter 5, entitled "Prevent Our Enemies
from Threatening Us, Our Allies and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass
Destruction", which fleshes out the concept of anticipatory military
action.[42]
The ideas of
prevention / preemption are developed in great detail in the document, whereas
other statements remain rather vague (for example: what does the objective
"to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and
precise operations to achieve decisive results" mean in concreto?). Also
the "loose language"[43]
of the document leaves much room for interpretation of the U.S. view on
anticipatory defence.
Only a small
minority of scholars believes that the National Security Strategy draws a clear
distinction between the terms "prevention" and
"preemption".[44]
This thesis follows the more convincing and better argued claim of the majority
of academic commentaries that the two terms are used interchangeably in the
document. Francois Heisbourg, chairman of the Board of the International
Institute for Strategic Studies in London, gives one example for the confusion:
"For example, chapter 5, intended to define and outline the concept of
preemption uses the verb 'prevent' in its heading to summarize the chapters
contents."[45] Another
passage (taken from chapter 3) can also serve as a good example of this
problem. The USA, it states, wants to exercise its right of self-defence
"by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from
doing harm against our people and our country..." Preemptive action is
thus carried out in order not to preempt,
but in order to prevent.
Normally, the terms
"preemption" and "prevention" are both types of
anticipatory military defence. Both terms can be used to describe attacks on
other states before these other countries have attacked. But there is also a
difference between the meaning of the words. When "preemptive"
measures are used, the countered threat is already imminent. The classic
example of a preemptive strike is Israel's Six Days War. Israeli intelligence
found out that the neighbouring countries had already prepared and would start
an armed attack within the next few hours; the threat was imminent and there
was also concrete evidence for this claim. So Israel decided to strike first in
order to gain a tactical advantage and to minimise the risk for its own
civilians. "Preventive" war on the other hand is more what
Machiavelli has in mind, when he talks in his "Prince" about the war
between Romans and Macedonians. It was wise for the Romans to attack Macedonia,
he concludes, because if they had not, the rising power of Macedonia would have
posed a threat to Roman hegemony within the next ten or fifteen years. It is of
course very hard to prove such an assumption.
The "unfixed
terminology" of the National Security Strategy, which partly confuses
preemption and prevention, is most likely used intentionally in order to leave
potential opponents in a kind of uncertainty how the U.S. would actually react
to threats, which is, in strategic terms, not necessarily a bad idea. Still,
this wording also causes severe problems.
"Another
consequence of misusing the two terms is to confuse the public debate in the
international arena, inviting a confluence of strategic worst-case analysis and
political anti-U.S. sentiment both by U.S. allies and adversaries. Such
confusion can undermine mutual confidence and trust among U.S. allies and
partners while also increasing the domestic and international margin for
political manoeuvring by U.S. adversaries when contemplating radical
countermeasures, thus easing the way for all states with which the Unites
States interacts to make dangerous and destabilizing decisions."[46]
These arguments
indicate that anticipatory military strikes might provoke what they try to
prevent. If a dictator becomes convinced that he might be the next goal of U.S.
intervention, he might accelerate his attempts to build weapons of mass
destruction in order to be better prepared; he might also take into
consideration initiating terrorist attacks in order to defend himself against
U.S. intervention, which he cannot counter through conventional military means.
When the U.S.
Strategic Concept tells us more about prevention / preemption, it is in a way
that both downplays its novelty and appears to set limits on the actions it
advocates. Specifically, the document states that the United States has
entertained the option of anticipatory use of force in the past. Some authors
follow this argument and claim that preemption is just mentioned as an option, not as a principle or doctrine
in the National Security Strategy.[47]
U.S. secretary of
state Colin Powell also qualifies the relevance of anticipatory military attack
for the U.S. strategy when he declares:
"Sensible as
these reasons are, some observers have exaggerated both the scope of preemption
in foreign policy and the centrality of preemption in U.S. strategy as a whole.
As to preemption's scope, it applies only to the undeterrable threats that come
from nonstate actors such as terrorist groups. It was never meant to displace
deterrence, only to supplement it. As to its being central, it isn't. The
discussion of preemption in the NSS takes up just two sentences ... The United
States' National Security Strategy does commit us to preemption under certain
limited circumstances. We stand by that judgement, the novelty of which lies
less in its substance than its explicitness. But our strategy is not defined by
preemption."[48]
Ivo Daalder
strongly opposes Colin Powell's arguments. He insists that preemption is
crucial for U.S. foreign policy. I this is not the case for Powell, then at
least for president George W. Bush. In special reference to the National
Security Strategy, but also to Bush's Westpoint address he claims: "Of
course, as Colin Powell noted, the United States always had the option of using
force preemptively, and there were times it even had done so. But never before
had a president made the case for preemption in principle, let alone in
public."[49] And he
continues by claiming: "For Bush, however, preemption was not a mere
option, but what New York Times
reporter Michael Gordon called 'a cardinal principle' of his foreign policy.
Otherwise, why call it a doctrine as the president did? Why give presidential
speeches about it and place it in the heart of a public national strategic
document?"[50]
These arguments are
convincing; prevention / preemption seem to be more important for the new U.S.
strategy than Colin Powell's article suggests.
Critics level
another complaint against this new doctrine. Many question why the
administration decided to make a public statement about something that had been
an option of U.S. policy for quite a while. "It is not clear to me what
advantage there is in declaring it publicly" said Brent Scowcroft,
national security advisor during the Ford and first Bush administration.
"It has been common knowledge that under some certain circumstances the U.S.
would preempt. As a declaratory policy it tends to leave the door open for
others who want to claim the same right. By making it public we also tend to
add to the world's perception that we are arrogant and unilateral."[51]
Indeed, days after
the publication of the strategy, Russia hinted that it might have to intervene
in Georgia to go after Islamic terrorists. Also India embraced preemption as a
universal doctrine. Is it in the interest of the United States or of any
political actor that such a doctrine becomes a universal principle? It is most
certainly not because this might cause destabilisation in international
politics. The strategy recognises the problem by warning nations not to
"use preemption as a pretext for aggression". But it fails to identify
what separated justifiable preemption from unlawful aggression.[52]
The positive side
of the National Security Strategy therefore seems to be, that it correctly
assesses many new threats and tries to react to the new security environment
after the Cold War. Nevertheless, the suggested solutions cause severe problems
that might in the long run not increase, but rather decrease security for the
U.S. Perhaps we can conclude that the so-called "Bush doctrine" poses
the right questions for a new century. But does it provide the right answers?
PART 2: “A Secure Europe in a Better World” - The European Security Strategy
2.1. Historical
background
The differences
among European states concerning the war in Iraq 2003 and the ongoing
development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) have increased the
need for a common strategic approach of all EU countries. Therefore the High
Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy was asked to draft a
"European Security Strategy", which he entitled "A Secure Europe
in a Better World". Javier Solana presented this paper to the European
Council in Thessaloniki on June 20, 2003. After his presentation an interactive
process of consultation was initiated, which especially involved the national
foreign ministries. Three seminars with scholars from all over the continent
also gave special inputs on the concept. By end of November 2003 the work was
completed. The final version was accepted by the European Council in Brussels
on December 12, 2003 under Italian presidency.[53]
According to Riemer
/ Hauser the final version of the European Security Strategy (Brussels,
December 2003) does not significantly differ from the draft Javier Solana
proposed to the European Council in Thessaloniki in June 2003.[54]
They neither argue this claim nor make reference to other authors in a
footnote.
The findings of
this thesis, which rest on a comparison of the original texts, suggest that
there are at least two differences worth mentioning, although the text largely
stayed the same.
·
Solana's first
draft only mentions three key threats ("terrorism",
"proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" and "failed
states and organised crime"). The final version is more differentiated and
mentions five key threats ("terrorism", "proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction", regional conflicts", "state
failure" and "organised crime")
·
The final version
became more "interventionist" by replacing the term
"preemptive" through "preventive". (Solana's draft:
"Pre-emptive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the
future." Final version: "Preventive engagement can avoid more serious
problems in the future"). Of course it is not clear in this context what
"engagement" actually means. According to plausible interpretations
the European Security Strategy mainly takes into account political, economic
and humanitarian measures, without explicitly ruling out military engagement,
which should only be the last resort.[55]
Additionally, it
might also be worth mentioning that "sex trade", which is missing in
Solana's first draft, is added as a major problem in the final version. The
final version also adds an affirmation of the two states solution for the
Israeli-Palestinian-conflict, which is only a repetition of a position that
most European countries have defended for a long time.
The document is the
first Security Strategy in the history of the European Union and therefore,
despite all possible deficits, a very important step forward in the field of
European security policy. It must also be seen in the context of the European
Convent and the drafting of a "European Defence Book". This document
will develop EU's military scenarios and assignments for the future.[56]
The European
Security Strategy can also be read as an answer to the National Security
Strategy of the United States of America. It is an attempt to keep Europe
involved in the discussion about new threats and possible counter-measures. Its
emphasis on the importance of transatlantic relations can also be interpreted
as an attempt to bridge or downplay the gap between American and European
Strategy that became increasingly clear during the war in Iraq.
Solana's draft was
received positively throughout Europe and even in the USA.[57]
No one knows if this is a good or a bad sign.
2.2. Summary of
main contents
The objective of
this section is again to paraphrase and summarise the document and give an
impression of its content. This should serve as a basis for the critical
comments in the next section (2.3.)
The European
Security Strategy is a document of about 15 pages. It contains an introduction
of one single page and a conclusion of one small paragraph, which is rather
vague and hardly worth mentioning (therefore it is left out in this section).
In between it is divided in three chapters. The first deals with the key
threats in a new security environment, the second with strategic objectives,
the third with policy implications for the European Union. Each chapter is
divided into two to four sub-sections.
Introduction
The introduction
emphasises the crucial role the Union plays in securing peace and stability on
the European continent. Through common institutions countries are committed to
dealing peacefully with disputes and to cooperating through common
institutions. The USA has played a critical role in European integration and
security. No country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own, not
even the USA with its dominant military potential. The Balkan war has reminded
us that war has not disappeared from the European continent. The EU with its 25
states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's gross
national product is "inevitably" a global player; it has the
responsibility of engaging for global security and building a better world.
Chapter I: The Security Environment: Global Challenges
and Key Threats
·
Global Challenges
This section deals
with globalisation as a background for today's international relations.
Globalisation has increased European dependence on the rest of the world and therefore
its vulnerability. Nonstate actors have become more and more important. New
wars currently pose huge problems. Civilians are mainly its victims; many of
them are either killed or become refugees. Poverty is a problem, but so are
diseases like AIDS. Future challenges will include competition for natural
resources (including water); European energy dependence is also a special
concern.
·
Key Threats
The key threats the
European Union has to face are the following:
ü Terrorism
ü Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
ü Regional Conflicts
ü State Failure
ü Organised Crime
All these phenomena
are somehow linked to one another. Failed states might for instance provide a
perfect hideout for terrorists (like in Somalia and other countries). But there
are also links between terrorism and organised crime. Trafficking of drugs and
women poses serious problems to the EU. The growth in maritime piracy is also
alarming.
Chapter II: Strategic Objectives
·
Addressing the
Threats
According to the
European Security Strategy, the EU has been active in tackling the key threats.
These activities include measures against terrorism (adoption of a European
Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing, agreement on mutual legal
assistance with the USA). Steps against proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction have also been taken. The European Union has been engaged in
mission to deal with regional conflicts, ranging from the Balkans, Afghanistan
to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The traditional concept of self-defence
from the Cold War is based on the threat of an invasion, which is more and more
unlikely. The new threats in a globalised world demand global activity
("...the first line of defence will often be abroad"). Early engagement
is necessary ("Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too
early"). The new threat cannot be tackled by purely military means but
require a "mixture of instruments".
·
Building Security
in Our Neighbourhood
Even in an era of
globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the interest of the EU
that the countries on its borders are well-governed. The section can be read as
an affirmation of the "theory of democratic peace which claims that
democratic governments are less war-prone than authoritarian regimes.[58]
The EU's task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to its east and
on the borders of the Mediterranean. Conflict areas like the Balkans must be
stabilised. Enlargement should not create new dividing lines in Europe. The
resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority. The EU should
consider a stronger engagement in the Southern Caucasus and the Arab World.
·
An International
Order Based on Effective Multilateralism
This section
contains the EU's commitment to an effective multilateral system based on
international law. The fundamental framework for international relations in the
United Nations Charter. The United Security Council has (this is an affirmation
of art.24 of the UN-Charter) the primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security. The EU is dedicated to strengthening the UN.
The EU wants to protect this kind of international order and therefore must
"be ready when their rules are broken". The EU affirms the widening
of membership of the World Trade Organisation. Again there is an emphasis on
the importance of the transatlantic relationship. The EU also supports the
OSCE, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union. The European Security Strategy
also states its support for the International Criminal Court.
The section ends
with a kind of threat to "rogue states" without explicitly mentioning
this polemic term or giving concrete examples:
"A number of
countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society.
Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It
is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and
the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so
should understand that there is a price to be paid, including their
relationship with the European Union."
Since the EU is a
huge economic power, it can be assumed that the loss of this relationship could
indeed be costly.
Chapter III: Policy Implications for Europe
·
More Active
The European Union
must be more active in pursuing its strategic objectives. The section mainly
consists of some phrases that can mean all or nothing because they are not
concrete enough: "Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats.
We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when
necessary, robust intervention." It would have been nice of Mr.Solana to
clarify how such a strategic culture will look and what "robust
intervention" means in concreto. Is this passage a reference to
diplomatic, economic or military interventions? The passage is one of the best
examples of the vagueness, and therefore deficits, of the European Security
Strategy.
According to the
document, the EU is ready to assist the UN. The European Security Strategy
contains an affirmation of "preventive engagement". But it is not
clear from the formulation, what "engagement" actually means.
·
More Capable
Europe should
become more capable by transforming its militaries into more flexible, mobile
forces. "Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce
duplications, overheads and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities."
The European Security Strategy contains a commitment to stronger diplomatic
capabilities, common threat assessments and the sharing of intelligence among
member states.
A wider spectrum of
mission like "joint disarmament operations", support for third
countries in combating terrorism and security sector reforms are envisaged. The
provisions in this sections again are rather vague: how will such "joint
disarmament operations" look? Is it just voluntary disarmament that is
monitored? Or will they include the ability to disarm certain groups against
their will?
The strategic
partnership between NATO and EU is affirmed, in particular in the context of
the Berlin Plus summit. A possible rivalry between the two political entities
is not taken into account.
·
More Coherent
Europe is stronger
when it acts together. The different instruments of CFSP, ranging from the European
Development Fund to military and civilian capabilities from member states, have
to be brought together. "In crisis there is no substitute for unity of
command." There should be better co-ordination between external relation
and Justice and Home Affairs policies, which is crucial for the fight against
terrorism and organised crime.
Greater coherence
is needed in the external activities of the individual member states and for
the solution of regional conflicts. However, it is not clear from the formulation
of the European Security Strategy what this means in concreto.
·
Working with
Partners
The EU puts strong
emphasis on international cooperation, especially with the USA: "The
transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European
Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world.
Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is
an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and
increase its coherence."
According to the
European Security Strategy the EU should build up a "closer
relationship" with Russia; the European Security Strategy does not specify
what aspects such a relationship would include. Would there be military
cooperation? Such a "closer relationship" should also be built up
with "neighbours" and "partners" in Africa, Latin America
and Asia, but there is no reference to who these neighbours and partners are.
The EU should also build up "strategic partnerships" with Japan,
China, Canada and India. There is no statement how these partnership should
look like and what strategic purpose they serve.
2.3. Comments on core
elements
2.3.1. Lack of political will
The European
Security Strategy remains in many respects rather vague and lacks concrete
provisions.[59] This is not
necessarily a bad sign. Every Security Strategy must contain by its very nature
a certain kind of vagueness. U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell explained
this in the context of the National Security Strategy of his country:
"Of course, a
public strategy document cannot be entirely frank about all choices that U.S.
leaders make; we do ourselves and our allies no favor by telling our
adversaries everything that we think and plan."[60]
But in the case of
the European Security Strategy the reason why it sometimes lacks clarity might
also be just the exact opposite of strategic competence. The European Union's
foreign policy is still structured after an "intergovernmental" pattern.
There is not one government that decides the strategy, but there are 25
governments that do so; and they have to find a consensus. Sometimes opinions
might differ so much that a consensus on concrete points simply cannot be
reached. It is plausible to suspect that some important gaps in the Strategic
Concepts can be explained by this problem. The war in Iraq in 2003 has actually
sparked off the drafting of a common strategy; but this war is not mentioned at
all in the document - the differences were simply to huge to overcome. But
critics also mention other examples: in the relations with China, Russia or the
Middle East, European states follow very often their own national approaches,
which can prevail over the common European perspective.[61]
A strategy has the
purpose of expressing a political will and preparing its implementation. If
such a will does not really exist, but if the so-called common political will
is just a vague consensus on some general assumptions, a strategy loses at
least some, if not most, of its value. This might be the main problem of the
European Security Strategy.
2.3.2. EU's war on terrorism - achievements and
failures
According to the European
Security Strategy, terrorism is one of the Union's "key threats". In
the second part of the Security Strategy, the EU proudly reports that it
"has been active in tackling the key threats":
"It has responded after 11
September with measures that included the adoption of a European Arrest
Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal
assistance with the USA."
Indeed, the European Union was
able to give an answer to the attacks, especially in the field of its
"third pillar". The main lines of its actions were drawn in the
conclusions of the Extraordinary European Council on 21 September 2001 in
Brussels and in those of the JHA council a day before. A total of 68 measures
were listed in a “road map”.[62]
These included the creation of a European Arrest Warrant, laws against the
financing of terrorism, enhancing the role of Europol and setting up a common
definition of terrorism. But after the recent terrorist attacks on March 11,
2004 in Madrid the efficiency of all these measures seems questionable.
But leaving the EU's "third
pillar" aside we must ask how the European Union reacted to terrorism in
the important field of foreign policy and how effective this was?
The first reaction of the EU to
the collapse of the twin towers was a demonstration of complete transatlantic
solidarity.[63] It was
expressed in the "joint declaration on terrorist attacks in the US"
adopted on 14 September 2001, bringing together the Heads of State and
Government, the Presidents of the European Parliament and the Commission, and
the High Representative. In this document it was stated that the American
people could "count on our complete solidarity and full cooperation to
ensure that justice is done". The conclusions of the above-mentioned
Extraordinary European Council in Brussels on 21 September 2001 declared the
attack to be “an assault on our open, democratic, tolerant and multicultural
societies”. But the Council also emphasised the importance of a UN mandate as a
legitimate base for US reactions, which was actually achieved for the war in
Afghanistan.
The European allies also invoked
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which was a remarkable decision.
Originally this article was designed to guarantee U.S.-support for Europe
against the Soviet threat; at the beginning of the 21st century, when
it was invoked for the first time in history, it served as expression of
European support for the USA against a non-state actor.[64]
The USA virtually ignored NATO support, obviously because it wanted to act
without any interference of its allies unlike in the Kosovo war.[65]
European participation in the decision-making process was seen as a constraint
that had to be avoided.
One of the main achievements of
the EU’s external relations in the war against terrorism was an intensive diplomatic
effort aimed at building up a broad international coalition.[66]
Shortly after the attacks at the World Trade Center, there were ministerial
troika visits to several Middle East countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and
Iran, followed by visits to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Belgian
prime-minister Guy Verhofstadt and Romano Prodi, representing the presidencies
of European Council and EU Commission, conducted diplomatic missions to several
Middle Eastern countries and also India and Pakistan in November.
An important success of the EU
was the conclusion of a cooperation agreement with Pakistan. This bilateral
treaty assured Pakistan's support in the war against the Taliban in exchange
for economic benefits. Until December 2002, the EU also granted more than 320
million Euro of emergency aid to Afghanistan and contributed to a huge amount
to its reconstruction. It can be shown that the CFSP can be an effective
instrument if it is backed by the financial capacities of the EU. But there were
also severe setbacks to the CFSP in these days:[67]
·
The EU lacked the military capability to actively participate in the war
against Afghanistan. It therefore could not and did not participate as a
military actor.
·
While the USA increased its defence budget by 48 billion dollars, the
European nations haggled over funding and demonstrated their unwillingness to
increase defence expenditure.
·
During the later war in Iraq, the tensions between supporters and critics
of U.S. engagement (UK, Poland and Spain versus Germany and France) became more
and more obvious and made common positions impossible.
·
After the beginning of the military operations in Afghanistan and on the
margins of the Ghent European Council on 19 October, the British, French and
Germans held a mini-summit. This meeting was publicly criticized, because
smaller nations suspected the three great powers of attempting the
establishment of a kind of “directorate” over Europe. In the end, although
there were no real results of the deliberations, Blair, Chirac and Schröder
were forced to invite other prime-ministers and the High Representative as
well. The tensions sparked off by this mini-summit makes another problem of
CFSP obvious. On the one hand, there was the impossibility to reach unanimous
agreements among all EU members and, on the other, there was the potential
clash of interests between great and small member states.
These failures and
massive problems in the war against terrorism, which have nothing to do with
the complex phenomenon of terrorism itself but rather with inefficiencies of
the current organisation of EU's foreign policy, are not mentioned in the
European Security Strategy.
2.3.3. Lack of military capabilities
The European
Security Strategy proudly announces that the EU has already initiated military
activities all around the globe.
"In the last
decade European forces have been deployed abroad to places as distant as
Afghanistan, East Timor and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The increasing
convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of
the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor."
Indeed there have
been military activities (in particular peace-keeping missions) on a small
scale, like in Congo, where 1.400 European soldiers tried to protect civilians
in and around the city of Bunia from massacre and civil war.[68]
Of course a real and permanent solution to the Congo conflict would have
required an intervention on a larger scale. This would have included the
occupation of the whole country, bloody combats in the jungle against brutal
militias whose soldiers have nothing to lose and even confrontation with armies
of children soldiers, which would have been difficult to justify to the
European public. Of course the European Union is not capable of waging a real
war abroad. The credibility of the EU as a global military actor exists as a
self-perception in the European Security Strategy, but it is hard to equate
these claims with the political reality.
The capabilities of
the European Union to perform military interventions around the globe are in
fact limited. One of the main characteristics of the contemporary international
system is the military dominance of the USA. The technological gap between the
USA and Europe is increasing. Soon even the most competent Europeans will have
difficulty to operate together with American troops.[69]
Despite its emphasis on the importance of transatlantic relations, the European
Security Strategy does not refer to the problems posed by this "capability
gap".
The United States
of America invests twice as much money on its military forces than all its
European allies together. But it not only spends more money, it also uses it
much more efficiently. The problem is that there is no common European defence
budget; rather the national states spend their money separately. By doing so,
they reach the worst of all possible results. They create no concentration of
military power comparable to the USA; they also lose precious synergy-effects
that could help saving a lot of money.[70]
The following table[71]
illustrates the military gap between Europe and the USA.
SPENDING FOR MILITARY RESEARCH AND EQUIPMENT IN
MILLION DOLLARS
|
COUNTRY |
RESEARCH |
EQUIPMENT |
TOTAL |
|
|
|
|
|
|
AUSTRIA |
10 |
323 |
333 |
|
BELGIUM |
1 |
233 |
234 |
|
DENMARK |
1 |
224 |
225 |
|
FINNLAND |
8 |
618 |
626 |
|
FRANCE |
3145 |
5450 |
8595 |
|
GERMANY |
1286 |
3389 |
4677 |
|
GREAT BRITAIN |
3986 |
8597 |
12586 |
|
GREECE |
26 |
1378 |
1404 |
|
IRELAND |
0 |
50 |
50 |
|
ITALY |
291 |
2291 |
2582 |
|
NETHERLANDS |
65 |
1341 |
1406 |
|
PORTUGAL |
4 |
366 |
370 |
|
SPAIN |
174 |
1062 |
1236 |
|
SWEDEN |
103 |
2114 |
2217 |
|
USA |
39349 |
59878 |
99218 |
Despite the
wide-spread unwillingness in Europe to take into account the military dimension
of power and the factor of power in world politics, these figures illustrate a
lack of military capabilities that could be overcome by rethinking the
inefficient national organisation of defence. This thesis does not suggest that
power rests solely upon military force. In today's world, economic strength and
scientific development are also crucial; and all different forms of "soft
power" can have a huge effect on practical politics. Nevertheless, the
widespread concept of the European Union as a "civilian power" is
questionable. Of course the Union can achieve something in the world by using
its huge economic potential and diplomatic skills. But is it really an
deliberate decision of the European Union to be a "civilian power"?
Or is this concept just a form of "window dressing", that distracts
from the actual incompetence of the Union in the military field? It would be an
unrealistic assumption to expect dialogue to be a universal concept that can
help under all possible circumstances and against all possible opponents
(including terrorists).
Under the title
"more capable" the European Security Strategy refers to this problem:
"A more
capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realise our
full potential. Actions underway - notably the establishment of a defence
agency - take us in the right direction. To transform our militaries into more
flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more
resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary. Systematic
use of pooled and shard assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the
medium-term, increase capabilities."
The problem with
these provisions is again that they remain rather vague; it depends on the kind
of practical implementation to judge if they can really offer a solution for
the above-mentioned problem.
The European
Security Strategy puts great emphasis on multilateral cooperation and
international law: "We are committed to upholding and developing International
Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United
Nations Charter. (...) Strengthening the United Nations (...) is a European
priority."
It is a highly
moral and extremely important objective to contribute to the creation and
preservation of a rule-based international order. But according to the director
for external relations of the European Council's general secretariat Robert
Cooper, there must be a police force behind every law in order to ensure its
implementation; and there must also be an army behind every constitution in
order to defend it. If the constitution Europe wants to give itself came into
force, it would, at the moment, be the American army that would have to defend
it.[72]
The European
Security Strategy states in reference to the USA that "no single country
is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own". This assessment is
correct. Unfortunately, the European Security Strategy does not provide an
answer to the question why an EU with limited military capabilities often
leaves the USA alone; and why a Europe of 450 million people so strongly relies
on 250 million Americans to defend it.
PART 3: On the Future of Transatlantic Relations – a Comparison between the Documents
3.1. Theoretical
background - the transatlantic relationship
3.1.1. Transatlantic relationship endangered?
After the collapse
of the Soviet Union in general and during the discussion about the war in Iraq
in 2003 in particular problems in the transatlantic relationship became increasingly
obvious. Some authors still consider the partnership between the USA and Europe
as firm despite all difficulties.[73]
They try to support this view with many and often convincing arguments. For
instance they emphasise the huge amount of transatlantic commercial relations,
which have not declined significantly.
Nevertheless,
diagnoses of rifts in the transatlantic partnership have become more and more
frequent. In his article “The West May Be Cracking”[74]
Francis Fukuyama asks if the “West” is still a coherent concept; and he implies
a negative answer. Actually, Fukuyama, unlike Samuel Huntington, is not at all
bothered about lines of conflict between different civilisations, but about the
line of conflict within the West.
These are especially visible in the following policy fields:[75]
·
Environment, security, human rights. The governments on both sides of the Atlantic have
been unable to find an acceptable compromise on several issues. Economic
conflicts have occurred, but since such disputes are embedded in the framework
of the WTO, they are no real threat. But there are other policy fields where
opinions differ to a huge extent. Europeans often have the impression that the
USA not only has its own solutions, but seems to have turned its back on the
idea of dialogue as a whole, preferring to defend its own interests by using
its enormous power assets without ever taking into account the interests of
other countries or of the international community.
German researcher
Gert Krell has listed a table of “US Unilateralist Sins”. These include the
following:[76]
Where the United States
has done nothing and / or hindered effective action:
Climate change. The USA have failed to take serious domestic action,
though its 5 percent of the world’s population accounts for 25 percent of
global carbon dioxide emissions.
Small arms trafficking. It has blocked or weakened key provisions of a draft
UN agreement (2001) to curb illicit trade in small arms.
Population and women’s
reproductive health.
U.S. assistance to foreign NGOs is cut off if they provide (even with non-U.S.
funds) legal abortion services, counselling, or referrals.
Where the United States
has done less than its fair share:
Development assistance. In gross terms, the United States is the largest
development assistance fund giver; but it ranks last among all rich countries
in contributions, giving less than a third of what Europe donates (U.S. gives
0.1 %, Europe’s average is 0.33%; even proposed rises by the Bush
Administration would not change this proportion significantly.
United Nations and
international dues.
As the largest UN debtor (owing $1.35 billion) the United States caused several
financial crises of the United Nations system in the 90s.
When the United States has
played by its own rules and / or imposed its own rules on others:
Trade. The United States has criticized developing
countries’ closed trading practices, but has imposed tarriffs on agriculture
and textile from other countries (as have Canada, the European Union and
Japan). It has defied WTO rules by increasing protectionist tariffs on steel
(2002). It has increased subsidies to U.S. farmers by 80 percent (2002).
Chemical Weapons
Convention. The USA ratified
the convention only after asserting special rights (1997) including the right
to refuse challenge inspections and prevent collected samples from leaving U.S.
territory.
Nuclear weapons and
proliferation. It withdrew from the
Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty to proceed with a U.S. national missile defence,
which, according to the fears of many allies could heat up the “spiral of
deterrence” again.
War crimes. It “un-signed” the Rome Treaty establishing the
International Criminal Court (2002) and announced that the court cannot expect
U.S. cooperation.
Extraterritorial
jurisdiction. The USA has
imposed unilateral, secondary sanctions that penalise foreign actors doing
business with states that the USA wants to punish, for example, the
Helms-Burton Cuba Sanctions Act (1996) and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (1996).
When the United States has
shaped agreements and then abandoned it:
Biological Weapons
Convention Protocol.
After six years of negotiations, the USA blocked a proposed monitoring and
verification system for the 1972 treaty banning germ warfare, leading 90
participating countries to postpone further action until November 2003.
Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty. After 40 years of
negotiations and a U.S. push to complete a test ban treaty, the United States
signed this treaty in 1996, only for the Senate rejected it in 1999.
Kyoto Protocol on Climate
Change. It obtained
numerous negotiating concession, including parties’ rights to use
market-oriented mechanisms (such as emission trading), but it then opposed the
treaty in 2001 without proposing any viable alternative. Many European
countries believe that climate change is a serious challenge for our security
and that it has to be addressed and countered through effective emission
control.
·
Countermeasures against new threats. While the USA seems to rely heavily on military
responses to new threats like terrorism, the Europeans in general seem to
prefer civilian methods ("soft power"). While the war in Afghanistan
was supported by most European allies, opinions began to differ a lot when the
USA decided to wage war against Iraq in 2003. European governments doubted that
this war could really counter terrorism. While the USA insisted that a “regime
change” in Bagdad could have a positive effect on the war against terrorism and
at the same time on the democratisation and therefore security of the region,
Europeans found this scenario unrealistic. Instead they thought it more likely
that a new war in Iraq could contribute to further radicalisation of the Arab
world.
·
Perception of the other side. Many Europeans consider the United States of America
a hegemonial power, who, despite all official claims, does not really believe
in international cooperation. The USA is said not to mind much about the
aggression and frustration its behaviour sparks off world-wide. Basic norms of
international law (like the prohibition of force in international relations or
the monopoly of the Security Council to legitimise war) are not respected. The
world-view of the Bush Administration divides the world into “good” and “evil”,
which is too simple; political reality is much more complicated. The USA, on
the other hand, often accuses Europeans of not accepting enough responsibility
for the international order they wish to be maintained. They refuse to spend
money on their military forces, leaving most of the military burden to the USA.
Then Europeans spend the resulting peace dividend for their costly social welfare
systems. Finally, they criticise the USA for making mistakes or for not
including all its allies in the decision-making process of its military
activity. It is worth noting that both sides may be right in their criticisms
of the other.
3.1.2. Why did the differences occur? Three
theoretical approaches
3.1.2.1. Realism
In a much cited
article ("Power and Weakness") Robert Kagan analyses current
transatlantic relations and thereby tries to develop a theoretical background
for the growing division. Since he strongly emphasises the factor of power in
his works, he puts himself in the tradition of structural realism.[77]
According to Kagan
Europeans and Americans do not share a common view of the world. This is
especially the case when it comes to the "all-important question of
power". Europeans seem to live in a "Kantian" world of perpetual
peace, whereas the Americans see themselves in a "Hobbesian" world of
anarchy and struggle for power. In a quite interesting metaphor, Kagan
attributes two planets to Europe and the USA: Europeans come from Venus, the
planet of love, whereas Americans seem to come from Mars, the planet of war.
Consequently,
Americans and Europeans pursue different strategies in international relations.
The USA resorts to force more quickly, whereas Europeans prefer diplomacy. The
USA divides the world into "good" and "evil", whereas
Europeans tend to see a more complex picture. And while the USA often relies on
unilateral military action, Europeans clearly prefer multilateral engagement
and respect for international law.
What are the reason
for these differences? According to Kagan, the transatlantic division was not
sparked off by one single event. He also insists that, despite the fact that
transatlantic relations have deteriorated with the inauguration of George W.
Bush, the current problem is not a George W. Bush problem. The tensions had
already become obvious under the Clinton Administration. So the current
difficulties actually have a long history.
As a whole, the different
perspective is a result of different power assets. The perspective of Americans
and Europeans are the perspectives of the strong and the weak. The strong can
afford military engagement and unilateralism. The weak try to protect
themselves by relying on international law and organisations.
The fact of
different power distribution also results in different approaches to diplomacy.
The patience of the USA is quickly exhausted, whereas Europeans are more
tolerant. This can be illustrated by the war in Iraq.
"A better
explanation of Europe's greater tolerance for threats is, once again, Europe's
relative weakness ... The psychology of weakness is easy enough to understand.
A man armed only with a knife may decide that a bear prowling in the forest is
a tolerable danger, inasmuch as the alternative - hunting the bear armed only
with a knife - is actually riskier than lying low and hoping the bear never
attacks. The same man armed with a rifle, however, will likely make a different
calculation of what constitutes a tolerable risk ... Europeans have concluded,
reasonably enough, that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is more tolerable
for them than the risk of removing him. But Americans, being stronger, have
reasonably enough developed a lower threshold of tolerance for Saddam..."[78]
The fact that the
different perspectives can be explained by different power assets becomes
obvious when one takes into consideration the historical perspective. In a way,
Europeans and Americans have changed roles over the century. Europe's love of
peace is relatively new in history. Formerly, it was the Europeans who followed
the principles of Machtpolitik and
the Americans in their new, weak and relatively threatened union who were in
favour of a rule-based international order. "America's eighteenth- and
early nineteenth century statesmen sounded much like the European statesman of
today..."[79] In this
quote, Kagan clearly underestimates the imperialist dimension of American
politics in the nineteenth century.
However, it is at this
point where the realist Kagan also introduces a kind of
"constructivist" argument: "Europe in the past half-century has
developed a genuinely different perspective on the role of power in
international relations, a perspective that springs directly from its unique
historical experience since the end of World War II. It is a perspective that
Americans do not share and cannot share..."[80]
For Kagan, the
current European "strategic culture" represents a rejection of the
European past. Machtpolitik and national
ambition led Europe into two dreadful world wars; and the European Union itself
is an "idealistic" answer to centuries of European warfare. This
idealism is in a way justified. Diplomacy, negotiation, forging of economic
ties etc. were the key to success of Franco-German rapprochement; and these
tools have made European integration possible. Why not offer this
"idealistic" method of establishing peace to the whole world?
Europeans have successfully stepped out of the Hobbesian world into a Kantian
world of perpetual peace. Why should other countries not follow the same way?
What according to
Kagan most Europeans do not see is the fact that European integration was only
possible because of American military protection:
"Europe's
evolution to its present state occurred under the mantle of U.S. security
guarantee and could not have occurred without it. Not only did the United
States for almost half a century supply a shield against external threats as
the Soviet Union and such internal threats as may have been posed by ethnic
conflict in places like the Balkans. More important, the United States was the
key to the solution of the German problem and maybe still is."[81]
The absurd
consequence of this situation is that Europeans criticize Americans for not
being "idealistic"; but at the same time they can only afford their
own idealism because of American military protection.
"The current
situation abounds its ironies. Europe's rejection of power politics, its
devaluing of military force as a tool of international relations, have depended
on the presence of American military forces on European soil. Europe's new
Kantian order could flourish only under the umbrella of American power
exercised according to the rules of the old Hobbesian order. American power made
it possible for Europeans to believe that power was no longer important. And
now, in the final irony, the fact that United States military power has solved
the European problem, Europeans today believe that American military power, and
the 'strategic culture' that has created and sustained it, are outmoded and
dangerous."[82]
What is to be done?
Overcoming the transatlantic gap will be difficult. Realist thoughts could
advise a kind of "balancing"[83]
of the United States of America. Maybe a stronger Europe could resist the
ambitions of this superpower, which is sometimes perceived as a "rogue
colossus"? But Kagan does not consider this scenario rather likely.
Europeans today are unwilling to shift
money from social programmes to military budgets. Nevertheless, the development
of European military capabilities could help to overcome at least some of the
difficulties - such as the huge "capability gap" between American and
European troops. Americans, on the other hand, could show more "decent
respect for the opinion of mankind". Taking into account the sensibilities
of others could be a step into the right direction.
3.1.2.2.
Constructivism
Social
constructivist approaches take into account the "ideal" dimension of
the transatlantic conflict. They are based on the importance of political
culture, shared experiences and world-views.[84]
Francis Fukuyama
emphasises the different "philosophical" perspective of the USA and
(continental) Europe on the nature of democratic legitimacy. The idea of
democratic legitimacy outside or beyond the nation state is alien to most
Americans. If an international organisation is politically legitimate, it's
because democratic elected majorities have negotiated and agreed upon their
creation through the conclusion of a treaty. Such a legitimacy can at any time
be withdrawn. According to this "philosophy", there is no
"independent" international organisation.[85]
Europeans, in
general, take a different point of view. They often believe in the existence of
an international community, one which is more important and enjoys greater
legitimacy than any single nation state. Though there is no political
organisation that can justly be called a world democracy, the idea of such a
community gives legitimacy to international organisations.[86]
But why do such
different perceptions exist? Constructivists would try to explain it by
pointing to different historical experience. In this context U.S. nationalism
has been called "exceptionalism" (Gert Krell).[87]
The first immigrants on the new continent wanted to create a new society, based
on principles morally superior to those the "old world" rests upon.
These principles were considered to be universal. It has always been hard to
accept for Americans that the "U.S. model" is in no way compulsory
for others, on the contrary, Americans tend to believe that what is good for
them is also good for the rest of mankind. Europe, on the other hand, has
learnt throughout its history that nationalism causes war, whereas supranational
institutions are identified with wealth and peace.
Additionally, one
cannot overestimate the importance of religion in American political life.
Politicians like Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush have a religious clientele,
which they want to address by using a certain political language. But it is not
just pure tactics; it also has to do with conviction. Fundamentalist traits in
the USA can be traced back to early Puritanism. In this way of thinking there
has always been the tendency to stick to a "Manichaean" world-view.
And there has always been a kind of "political messianism". The USA
tends to spread its values to the rest of the world.[88]
These
interpretations indicate that the differences between the USA and Europe are
not caused by recent events, but actually have a long history. But why have
these conflicts not occurred before? Why are they breaking out now? One
possible explanation given by a constructivist would be that the East-West
conflict actually distracted from all problems in the transatlantic
partnership; the common enemy made a common position necessary.[89]
One constructivist
solution or counter-strategy against the transatlantic division would be a
"dialogue of civilisation". Europe and the USA should, according to
this view, be able to build up a common identity. The educational system,
public authorities, NGOs should help to offer information about history,
identity etc. of the "other" side. Social contact and cultural
exchange programmes would also be very important. A critical question has to be
ask in this context would be if such a transatlantic dialogue would make sense.
One reason for the crisis in transatlantic relations is that many Europeans
accuse the USA of actually being unwilling to have a real dialogue. And there
is certain behaviour where there can be no dialogue: torture, rape and sexual
humiliation of prisoners of war American soldiers are responsible for must be
condemned; there can certainly be no dialogue about such actions.
3.1.2.3. Liberalism
At a first glance
liberal theories cannot contribute to an explanation of current transatlantic
differences. They rather seem to be able to explain why transatlantic relations
have been so stable over the past decades. According to liberals, democracies
do not wage war against each other; their potential to solve conflicts
peacefully is huge. This "theory of democratic peace" also gives hope
that the current transatlantic division will not lead to armed conflict between
Europe and the USA as long as they stay democratic.[90]
Liberalism can also
contribute another idea: foreign policy is also influenced by domestic affairs.
Current difficulties in the German-American relationship also escalated because
there was an election campaign in Germany to be fought and won. German Chancellor
Gerhard Schröder and his coalition partner were in difficulties; without the
promise not to participate in the war in Iraq they would almost certainly have
lost. It is difficult for a government in a democratic system to take decisions
and agendas that are simply not acceptable for their electorate.[91]
Liberals would also
point out that the American political system contains something like a
"lack of representation". It allows wealthy Christian fundamentalist
groups to strongly influence the government, despite the fact they do not
represent a majority of the people. Through funding of election campaigns
Christian right-wing fundamentalists have gained much more weight in the
Republican party than they deserve through their numbers. Their preferences
strongly collide with the preferences of other country's political elites.
Another problem of
the design of American political institutions is the requirement for the Senate
to ratify treaties by a 2/3-majority. This gives a small minority of senators
the right to veto the ratification of any treaty. One typical situation of the
American political system is that a government negotiates hard on a certain
treaty, reaches an agreement with other nations, the treaty is signed, and then
rejected by the Senate. This construction causes problems with international
partners.[92] One
possible solution to avoid such situation would be fundamental constitutional
reform. Such a project is currently lacking prospect of success.
3.2. Comparison of
texts
3.2.1. Size and quality
The National
Security Strategy of the United States of America is a document of slightly
more than 30 pages; the European Security Strategy only contains about 15
pages, about half the size of the American strategy. This simple fact shows
that the American concept is much more elaborated than the European
"answer" to it; and it also makes a more "professional"
impression.
To explain this
obvious difference, one must take into account at least two factors:
·
...as mentioned
above, the National Security Strategy expresses the will of only one
government, whereas the European Security Strategy represents a compromise
between many different governments. The American strategy can therefore by its
very nature be more coherent and much clearer.
·
...the USA has a
long tradition in formulating National Security Strategies; the EU has no
experience at all in this field. The European Security Strategy is the first of
its kind.[93]
The different size
and quality make a direct comparison of texts rather difficult. This can be
illustrated by the example of the political position on China. The National
Security Strategy tries to provide real strategic guidelines:
"The United
States relationship with China is an important part of our strategy to promote
a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region. We welcome the emerge
of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China. The democratic development of
China is crucial to that future. Yet, a quarter century after beginning the
process of shedding the worst features of Communist legacy, China's leaders
have not yet made the next series of fundamental choices about the character of
their state. In pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its
neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that,
in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness. In time, China
will find that social and political freedom is the only source of that
greatness.
The United States
seeks a constructive relationship with China. We already cooperate well where
our interests overlap, including the current war on terrorism and in promoting
stability on the Korean peninsula. Likewise, we have coordinated on the future
of Afghanistan and have initiated a comprehensive dialogue on counter-terrorism
and similar transitional concerns. Shared health and environmental threats,
such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, challenge us to promote jointly the welfare of
our citizens.
Addressing these
transnational threats will challenge China to become more open with information,
promote the development of civil society, and enhance individual human rights.
China has begun to take the road to political openness, permitting many
personal freedoms and conducting village-level elections, yet remains strongly
committed to national one-party rule by the Communist party. To make the nation
truly accountable to its citizen's needs and aspiration, however, much work
remains to be done. Only by allowing Chinese people to think, assemble, and
worship freely can China reach its full potential.
Our important trade
relationship will benefit from China's entry into the World Trade Organization,
which will create more jobs for American farmers, workers and companies. China
is our fourth largest trading partner, with over $ 100 billion in annual two-way
trade. The power of market principles and the WTO's requirements for
transparency and accountability will advance openness and the rule of law in
China to help establish basic protection for commerce and for citizens. There
are, however, other areas in which we have profound disagreements. Our
commitment to the self-defense of Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act is one.
Human rights is another. We expect China to adhere to its nonproliferation
commitments. We will work to narrow differences where they exist, but not allow
them to preclude cooperation where we agree."
On the other hand,
China is only mentioned twice in the European Security Strategy. In the last
section ("Working With Partners") the document states: "In
particular we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China,
Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and
values..." This statement can mean anything or nothing.
What will the
envisaged strategic partnerships look like? Will they mainly include cultural,
political, economic or military cooperation? And to what extent? Which partners
in Asia are most important? You cannot be friends and have good relations with
everyone. Japan and China might be potential rivals in the future; and
currently Taiwan also tries to defend itself against its Chinese
neighbours - whom will the EU support
in the first place?
But many other
questions arise: How do current European relations with China look like? Are
there common values, common objectives? Or do disagreements prevail? What do
Europeans expect from the Chinese government? How will Europe try to find
access to the growing Chinese market? How does Europe judge Tibet's occupation
and political oppression? If China violates human rights on a large scale, how
will this affect economic cooperation with the EU? Will the Europeans then
refuse to conclude trade agreements with China? Or will the search for profit
prevail over the idea of human rights? Or will some European countries refuse
to cooperate with China, while others will even try to increase commercial
relations (which would be a likely but not very coherent European strategy)?
And what if China becomes a world power in the 21st century and
tries to challenge other actors in the region, for instance even the USA? How
would the EU react to such a situation? All these important questions are
neither answered nor even addressed in the document.
Only the fact of
China's WTO membership is stated and affirmed: "China has joined the WTO
and Russia is negotiating its entry. It should be an objective for us to widen
the membership of such bodies while maintaining their high standards."
There are no further comments on how China's WTO membership will affect Europe
in particular.
What will be the
obvious conclusion of such a comparison of the two Security Strategies? On the
one hand, it seems that the USA cares more about Asia than the Europeans do.
This might have to do with geographic proximity, but also with European
ignorance about the Pacific region and its huge potential. It would have been
important for a European Security Strategy to provide at least some concrete
guidelines of EU engagement in Asia, which will certainly play a crucial role
in the 21st century.
On the other hand, it
also has become clear that the USA has a strategy, whereas the EU only pretends
to have one. Maybe the EU member states are simply not capable of reaching a
consensus on their policy towards China. But leaving the concrete example
aside, the general problem is that a comparison between a relatively concrete,
elaborated, professional Strategic Concept and a vague, short and
unprofessional one is rather difficult.
3.2.2. Self-confidence
Whether scholars
agree or disagree with the main contents of the National Security Strategy, one
is for sure: the document does not lack self-confidence. This can be
illustrated by several quotations:
"The United
States possesses unprecedented - and unequaled - strength and influence in the
world. Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and the value of a free
society, this position comes with unparalleled responsibilities, obligations,
and opportunity." (Chapter I)
"Our forces
will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a
military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United
States." (Chapter IX)
"In exercising
our leadership, we will respect the values, judgement, and interests of our
friends and partners. Still, we will be prepared to act apart when our interests
and unique responsibilities require." (Chapter IX)
"Ultimately,
the foundation of American strength is at home. It is in the skills of our
people, the dynamism of our economy, and the resilience of our
institutions." (Chapter IX)
A comparison with
similar passages from the European Security Strategy shows that the fact that
the EU is or can be a world power is only hesitatingly affirmed as a kind of
unpleasant reality. For example Solana's first draft states: "As a union
of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's
Gross National Product (GNP), the European Union is, like it or not, a global
actor..." In the final version of the European Security Strategy the
phrase "like it or not" is replaced by "inevitably".
Both restrictions
can be interpreted as a lack of Europeans self-confidence. Obviously many
Europeans are not yet happy with the idea that their Union might become a world
power. This might be due to the fact they are not used to having power since
1945. While the United States seems to be very proud of its privileged status
and makes it clear that it will mercilessly crush all its adversaries, the
European Union still seems somewhat ashamed of being more influential than
other actors in the international field. There might also be many Europeans who
fear the new responsibilities a world power has to take over to maintain a
functioning international order? A new Europe will have to accept the idea of
having considerable strength; it will also have to defend its interests against
rivals in the international field if it wants to be respected.
Will the European
Union one day be able to develop a coherent and strong political will? Will it
be able to officially affirm its leading position in the world without any
hesitations and restrictions?
Will new
generations of its citizens be able to overcome the deadly and inhuman ideology
of nationalism, which has sparked off so many wars in the past; which has torn
the one European culture politically apart; which is the main political
"disease" this continent is suffering from since centuries? And will
they realise that there is a common good beyond the nation state that has to be
given priority?
Will the European
Union in the end accept its new status as one of the great multicultural
empires of the 21st century, will it overcome all foreign dependencies and will it be prepared to use
its enormous power assets in order to resist all its potential political,
economic and military competitors? Maybe this glorious day will never come; at
least it has not yet arrived.
3.2.3. Assessment of threats
A comparison of the
two texts indicates that their assessment of threats is largely the same. This
view is supported by the findings of other authors.[94]
Despite the fact
the two texts indicate a common transatlantic threat assessment, the question
arises if the “real” threat assessment of European and American political
elites might actually be different or become different in the future.
Especially after the terrorist attacks of Madrid on March 11, 2004, Europeans
might consider themselves as “secondary targets”. Presumably Al Qaeda would not
have chosen to attack Spain if it had not been an ally of the USA in the Iraq
war. Therefore a military alliance with the USA might even increase potential
threats through terrorist networks. Of course terrorist networks should not be
allowed to blackmail European governments or exercise influence in domestic
affairs. On the other hand, Europeans will find it harder to support U.S.
actions in the future, especially if American mistakes and unacceptable
behaviour (like torturing and sexually humiliating prisoners of war in Iraq)
might increase hatred in the Arab world. Europeans might ask if it is fair and
just that they have to pay the price for it. The official European Security
Strategy of course does not express such wide-spread doubts.
3.2.4. Fight against HIV / AIDS
The fight against
HIV / AIDS is given a great priority in the National Security Strategy. In this
context it shows that the U.S. strategy does not exclusively contain a focus on
military solutions.
George W. Bush
announces in his introduction that the United States of America "... will
also continue to lead the world in efforts to reduce the terrible toll of HIV /
AIDS and other infectious diseases..."
The National
Security Strategy therefore develops concrete measures for the fight against
HIV / AIDS. Under the section "Promote the connection between trade and
development" in Chapter IV it states:
"Beyond market
access, the most important area where trade intersects with poverty is in
public health. We will ensure that the WTO property rules are flexible enough
to allow developing nations to gain access to critical medicines for
extraordinary dangers like HIV / AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria."
The Bush
Administration also emphasises its contribution to the International
Development Association (IDA), which is the World Bank's fund for the poorest
countries and states in the National Security Strategy that it has reversed the
downward trend in U.S. contributions and proposed a major financial increase.
This is also important in the fight against HIV / AIDS:[95]
"As a result
of U.S. leadership, the recent IDA agreement provided for significant increases
in grant funding for the poorest countries for education, HIV / AIDS, health,
nutrition, water, sanitation, and other human needs."
In Chapter VII the
United States also shows awareness of the fact that the education systems of
many African countries "have been devastated by HIV / AIDS". The USA
promises to help these education systems through increased funding and by
providing information technologies.
Finally the
National Security Strategy expresses its confidence that the joint threat
through HIV / AIDS can bring about a constructive relationship and cooperation
especially with China.[96]
The European
Security Strategy also assesses HIV / AIDS as a major threat. In Part I it
states under the section "Global Challenges":
"In much of
the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise
to pressing security concerns ... AIDS is now one of the most devastating
pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies. New
diseases can spread rapidly and become global threats. "
This assessment of
threats is correct. HIV / AIDS affects millions of people especially in
developing countries, but it has also spread to Western countries. In several
African countries it affects such a huge percentage of the population that it
even might contribute to state failure. HIV / AIDS is no longer solely a
medical problem. Since it effects so many people and even questions the
survival of whole societies it has also become a security problem. Both
Security Strategies have realised this. This shared assessment and the
political will to solve this problem is something the two documents have in
common. Both the USA and the EU have the same goal: the global fight against
HIV / AIDS.
However, there is
reason to believe that there might be different strategies concerning the means
used in this fight. It is impossible to gain information about the common or
different means through a comparison of the two documents because the European
Security Strategy also remains silent about the envisaged means.
According to Holly
Burkhalter, who works as a director of the Health Action AIDS campaign at the
organisation "Physicians for Human Rights" the Bush Administration
has pushed AIDS to the forefront of its agenda prodded by its conservative
evangelical base, that has recently adopted this topic into its political
programme. Such a conservative background might cause problems:
"The future of
U.S. global AIDS policy will be complicated, however, because the conservative
groups interested in the topic have different tactical priorities than their
liberal counterparts and the broader medical establishment. They have
traditionally been hostile to some important AIDS-prevention strategies such as
comprehensive sex education and condom distribution, and they are much more
enthusiastic than others about policies such as the promotion of
abstinence."[97]
The Bush
Administration's AIDS plan is to a certain amount shaped by religious
conservatives. Preventive programmes have especially come under their attack.
The so-called "Family Research Council" publicly insisted that the
Administration's programme will not become "an airlift for condoms".
By the time legislation implementing the president's vision (United States
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003) was
completed, conservatives in the House of Representatives redirected one-third
of its AIDS-preventing funding toward programmes urging abstinence before
marriage.
These conservatives
are inspired by Uganda's "ABC" (Abstinence,
Be faithful, use Condoms) approach and are
particular fans of its A and B components. They are convinced that these two
components alone, if faithfully adopted, can drastically lower the rate of HIV/AIDS
transmission. However, scientific evaluation shows different results. Studies
of Ugandan AIDS prevalence that try to assess the relative contributions of
abstinence, multiple-partner reduction, and condom use in lowering infection
rates have found that abstinence actually made the smallest contribution, while
condoms and partner reduction had the largest impact.[98]
At home, the
current U.S. government provides $100 million per year for abstinence
education, making the aid conditional on schools' commitment to neither endorse
condoms nor provide instruction on their use. Kenneth L. Connor, president of
the "Family Research Council", has suggested extending such policies
to Africa, on the grounds that "responsible moral behavior is the first
and best line of defense against AIDS, and is the only message we should send
to young people worldwide".[99]
But here again,
researchers who have compared abstinence-only and comprehensive sex-education
programmes in the United States have found little evidence that the former have
any effect on sexual behaviour or contraceptive use among sexually active
teenagers. What was revealed was that these teenagers who received
comprehensive sex-education were more likely both to delay sexual initiation
and to use condoms once they did start having sex than their peers who received
abstinence-only instruction. Another problem with the abstinence approach is
that it fails to help certain marginalised groups who are especially at risk of
HIV infection (intravenous drug users, homosexuals, prostitutes), which might
be the conservative intention behind it.[100]
Despite the fact
the European Security Strategy does not talk about its intended means in the
fight against HIV / AIDS, it can be assumed that Europeans in general are not
in favour of campaigns promoting sexual abstinence; and European political
elites are not likely to share the values of America's religious conservatives.
This assumption leads to the conclusion that despite the fact both Security
Strategies seem to have similar approaches concerning the goals, the approaches
of practical implementation might differ to a huge extent.
3.2.5. Transatlantic relations
Both Security
Strategies emphasise the importance of the transatlantic relationship. Both
documents also affirm the crucial role of NATO.
The National
Security Strategy states in Chapter VIII:
"There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can
accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and
friends in Canada and Europe. Europe is also the seat of two of the strongest
and most able international institutions in the world: the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), which has, since its inception, been the fulcrum of
transatlantic and inter-European security, and the European Union (EU), our
partner in opening world trade."
It must be
mentioned that the importance of Europe for the USA has been questioned by many
scholars:
“… there is in
Europe a considerable amount of strategic nostalgia. This is evident in the
refusal of many national leaders and policymakers to believe how low a priority
America accords to the continent.” [101]
The European
Security Strategy states in Part II ("An International Order Based of
Effective Multilateralism"):
"One of the
core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship.
This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international
community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this
relationship."
Again, the National
Security Strategy contains more ideas about the future role of NATO than the
European Security Strategy. NATO's forces have to be transformed in order to
adapt its capabilities to new circumstances. It must be able "to field, at
short notice, highly mobile, specially trained forces". The National
Security Strategy puts a special emphasis on technological opportunities,
global engagement and multinationality. The document affirms the need of future
NATO enlargement. Interoperability with allies must be maintained "even as
we take the necessary step to transform and modernize our forces". The
strategy seems to be perfectly aware of the above-mentioned "capability
gap" between the technological standard of the USA and its European
allies.
The similarities of
the two texts indicate that the importance of transatlantic relationship is a
consensus on both sides of the Atlantic and the partnership stands firm.
However, there could be an alternative interpretation: if the transatlantic
relationship had not been shattered through certain political events, it would
not have been necessary to publicly announce its continuing importance. The
Roman emperors only saw the need to print "concordia militium"
(harmony of the troops) on their coins when this harmony was somehow in
question. What will the future of transatlantic relationship look like? Will a
stronger Europe be integrated into transatlantic structures?
If the provisions
of Chapter IX of the National Security Strategy are taken seriously, one can
assume that the USA will not allow any potential rival to develop military
capabilities similar to its own:
"Our forces
will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a
military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States."
This also means
that if Europe wants to build up own military capabilities similar to the USA,
it has to be prepared to face heavy American resistance; the USA might
therefore become a potential foe. Can transatlantic harmony only be preserved
if Europe refuses to become (in the words of the European Security Strategy)
"more active, more capable and more coherent", at least in a military
sense? Should the EU choose staying weak in order to satisfy its "big
brother"? Will the EU and NATO one day become rivals, despite the results
of the "Berlin Plus"-summit?
3.2.6. International Criminal Court (ICC)
The European Union
unconditionally affirms the creation of an International Court. Under the
headline "An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism"
the European Security Strategy states:
"It is a
condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to
developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming. We have an
interest in further developing existing institutions such as the World Trade
Organisation and in supporting new ones such as the International Criminal
Court."
The National
Security Strategy rather perceives the International Criminal Court as a
threat. In Chapter IX the document states:
"We will take
the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security
commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for
investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court
(ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not
accept. We will work together with other nations to avoid complications in our
military operations and cooperation, through such mechanisms as multilateral
and bilateral agreements that will protect U.S. nationals from the ICC. We will
implement fully the American Servicemembers Protection Act, whose provisions
are intended to ensure and enhance the protection of U.S. personnel and
officials."
Some scholars
support the American point of view.[102]
Since it is the United States which has to carry the burden of maintaining the
international order (due to European military incompetence), it should have
something like a privileged status. For example, the USA will not be capable of
performing important humanitarian interventions in other countries to protect
minorities from genocide (like in Kosovo) if its soldiers can at any time be
sued before such an International Criminal Court. Such a Court can be misused
as a political instrument by America's political opponents. Such a situation
might prove to be a heavy burden for the American army, whose soldiers have the
right to fulfil their duty in accordance to the regulations of their nation
without having to fear persecution by multilateral institutions. The USA is a
civilised country and a democracy; war crimes can be dealt with before U.S.
institutions.
Others try to put
forward arguments that support the European position by calling U.S. policy
"janus-faced".[103]
On the one hand, the USA insists that war criminals (who live, for example, in
Serbia) and terrorists must be brought before an international court. It
threatens countries who do not comply with sanctions. On the other hand, it
tries to conclude bilateral treaties which would exempt U.S. nationals from
surrender or transfer to the International Criminal Court. It also uses
sanctions (like cutting military aid) against countries that refuse to grant
such exceptions to U.S. nationals.
Recent events in
Iraq have shown that the so-called civilised U.S. soldiers are of course
capable of committing war crimes. Photographs published by American media show
extreme violence that was used against Iraqi prisoners of war. Sometimes in
order to gain information, sometimes just for the entertainment of their guards
they were exposed to electrical shocks and even sexual humiliation. Many
prisoners had to undress and were forced to perform sexual acts even before
cameras, others were raped. One must also take into account that the victims
were Muslims, who consider such humiliations as extremely painful, especially
if it takes place in front of women, in this case female U.S. soldiers. The
national authorities of the United States initially hesitated to react to these
allegations and even tried to suppress the pictures. Now some of the criminals
have been suspended. But according to Amnesty International, the crimes were
not only performed by a few madmen, but had a rather systematic character.
There is no reason
why American soldiers should be allowed to commit such crimes in occupied
countries; and there is no reason why they should be immune or
"protected" from the jurisdiction of an International Criminal Court
if national authorities fail to punish them. If the United States claims to
represent and defend universal values like human rights, it must also agree to
be judged according to these standards.
3.3. Summary of the
Thesis / Conclusion
The objective of this thesis is to compare
two core documents of international relations: the National Security Strategy of
the United States of America (the "Bush doctrine") and the European
Security Strategy (the "Solana doctrine"). What do the Security
Strategies of the USA and the EU have in common, where are the main
differences? This topic ultimately leads to the question of the future of
transatlantic relations, which are currently suffering from major problems;
some authors even indicate that "the West is cracking" (Fukuyama).
Are America and Europe drifting apart? What does the comparison of the two
documents indicate, taking into consideration the relevant theoretical
background concerning transatlantic relations (realism, constructivism,
liberalism)?
This thesis
therefore consists of three parts:
PART I deals with the first of the two documents, the
National Security Strategy of the United States of America. After a sketch of
the history of the document and a summary of its main contents, the
commentaries emphasise the problematic situation the USA is caught in at the
moment: the country can be seen as omnipotent and at the same time powerless.
It is omnipotent, because it is the world's leading military power and can
intervene everywhere around the globe. It is nearly powerless against new
threats like terrorism, which hit by surprise and make the USA extremely vulnerable.
The National Security Strategy tries to face new threats by heavily relying on
preemptive / preventive military strikes. It is questionable if this strategy
will really fulfill its objective: making the world safer for the USA.
PART II deals with the second document, the European Security
Strategy. The commentaries on the text emphasise the lack of political will and
military capability behind the Strategic Concept, which is due to the national
organisation of foreign policy and defence, which should be replaced by more
supranational patterns.
PART III is a direct comparison of the two texts, with
particular reference to several chosen topics. The main results are the
following: the size and quality of the two Security Strategies differ to a
large extent. The National Security Strategy is almost twice as large than the
European Security Strategy; and it is much more elaborated, detailed and
concrete. Every Security Strategy must by its very nature be vague to a certain
extent (because it always contains more general provisions and must leave a
kind of uncertainty to the potential foe). Nevertheless, the vagueness of the
European Security Strategy is disturbing; it leaves the reader with an
uncertainty about the actual meaning of crucial provisions ("preventive
engagement", "robust intervention"). The differences in size and
quality can be explained by two facts: the National Security Strategy
represents the will of one government, the European Security Strategy is a
compromise of fifteen governments. After Enlargement 25 governments are
involved in strategic decisions. The vagueness of the document is sometimes due
to the fact that a consensus cannot be reached. In this context it is also
worth noting that the National Security Strategy also shows much more
self-confidence.
However, when the
provisions are concrete, it shows that they have something in common. The
assessment of threats (terrorism, weapons of mass destruction etc.) is largely
the same. But it must be noted that even if the formulation of the documents
indicate a common objective, the means envisaged in practical politics might
differ to a large extent. This can be illustrated by the "fight against
HIV / AIDS", which is a priority for both Security Strategies. But one
must take into account that the actual political measures used in this fight by
the Bush Administration are shaped by its Christian fundamentalist clientele,
which prefers abstinence before marriage to the distribution of condoms. It is
hard to imagine that European political elites share such preferences.
Sometimes the two Stategies also differ with respect to their objectives. While
the European Union strongly supports organisations like the International
Criminal Court (ICC), the USA explicitly refuses to accept its jurisdiction and
states that it will "protect" its soldiers from it. Recent
allegations concerning torture of Iraqi prisoners of war by U.S. servicemen
make this position morally dubious. The comparison therefore indicates that
there are differences in the European and the American position and that their
"strategic cultures" are drifting apart.
This thesis takes
into account several theoretical approaches which try to explain why current
transatlantic differences occur. Constructivism (which takes into account larger
communities' "social construction" of world-views through different
historical experiences) and liberalism (which mainly focuses on an analysis of
domestic affairs, the design of a certain democratic political system and its
influence on a country's foreign policy) can contribute to an explanation of
the growing gap. However, the solutions suggested by the theories are
questionable. For example, it would be a nice conclusion for a thesis to
suggest, with constructivism, the initiation of a transatlantic dialogue.
Unfortunately, it is hard to imagine having a dialogue with a politician like
George W. Bush who offers to the world the alternative either to be with or
against him. If this is the alternative, discussion is impossible. Either one
agrees or is perceived as a foe. One of the main problems of transatlantic
relations is that Europeans accuse Americans of having turned their back on the
idea of dialogue. It must also be taken into account that there is certain
unacceptable behaviour which makes dialogue impossible. This behaviour includes
torturing of prisoners of war, like in Iraq. It also includes American
facilities like Guatanamo Bay, where detainees are held like animals in small
cages and have no chance for a fair trial. There can be no dialogue about such
despicable human rights violations and with persons who are politically
responsible for them.
This thesis does
not suggest that realism is the best theory of international politics. Every
theory takes into account one certain perspective on a complex reality and can
therefore in a way improve our understanding. However, in the case of
transatlantic relations it seems that realism (as, for instance, represented by
the author Robert Kagan) can not only provide a coherent explanation of the gap,
but also meaningful suggestions for a possible solution to the problem. It has
been suggested that the USA, despite its enormous power potential and the
possible need to sometimes act unilaterally, should, especially under future
administrations, show more "decent respect for the opinion of
mankind". The European Union, on the other hand, should build up its own
military capabilities, equipped with the necessary resources, under a
supranational command structure. If the transatlantic alliance continues (and
in the short run there is no alternative for both sides) Europe could through
its increased capabilities become a more precious ally to the United States and
overcome the "capability gap" current transatlantic cooperation is
suffering from. A shared burden automatically must mean shared responsibility
and leadership.
But if it turns out
that cooperation one day becomes impossible, because the political positions
differ too much, Europe must learn to defend its own interests, pursue its own
objectives and stand on its own feet. The Old World has contributed too much to
civilisation to be just a political satellite of another great power.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Europäer in den Irak!
Die Zukunft der transatlantischen Beziehungen. In: Internationale Politik no.8, August 2003, p.57-66
Holly Burkhalter,
The Politics of AIDS. Engaging Conservative Activists. In: Foreign Affairs
Vol.83, No.1, January / February 2004, p.8-14
Robert Cooper, Macht und Ohnmacht - aus
europäischer Sicht. Eine Antwort auf die Thesen Robert Kagans. In: Internationale Politik no.5, May 2003, p.31-38
Ivo H. Daalder,
The End of Atlanticism. In: Survival vol.45, no.2, Summer 2002, p.147-166.
Ivo Daalder,
James Lindsay, America Unbound. The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy.
Washington D.C. 2003.
Johann Frank, Gustav Gustenau, Erich
Reiter, Anmerkungen zum Entwurf einer Europäischen Sicherheitsstrategie.
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[1] Andrea Riemer,
Gunther Hauser, Gesamtstrategien im Vergleich: Die Nationale
Sicherheitsstrategie der USA und die Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie; Riemer's
and Hauser's paper, published by the Austrian Military Academy, provides some
insights that served as a starting point of this study. However, their paper is not only very short (17
pages), but also contains some false and misleading information (see for
instance footnote 54).
[2] Ivo Daalder, America Unbound, p.122
[3] Ben Lombardi, The "Bush
Doctrine": Anticipatory Self-Defence and the New US National Security
Strategy, p.92
[4] Ibid.
[5] Francois Heisbourg, A Work in
Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences, p.76
[6] Karl-Heinz Kamp, Von der Prävention zur Präemption, Die neue amerikanische Sicherheitsstrategie, p.19; Joachim Krause et al., Wohin gehen die USA? Die neue Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der Bush-Administration, p.40
[7] Karl-Heinz Kamp, Von der Prävention zur Präemption, Die neue amerikanische Sicherheitsstrategie, p.19
[8] Ben Lombardi, The "Bush Doctrine":
Anticipatory Self-Defence and the New US National Security Strategy, p.93
[9] Joachim Krause et al., Wohin gehen die USA? Die neue Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der Bush-Administration, p.40
[10] Karl-Heinz Kamp, Von der Prävention zur Präemption, Die neue amerikanische Sicherheitsstrategie, p.20
[11] c.f. Ivo Daalder, America Unbound, p.120
[12] Karl-Heinz Kamp, Von der Prävention zur Präemption, Die neue amerikanische Sicherheitsstrategie, p.20
[13] Information and quotes from Ivo
Daalder, America Unbound, p.121-122
[14] Karl-Heinz Kamp, Von der Prävention zur Präemption, Die neue amerikanische Sicherheitsstrategie, p.19
[15] Andrea Riemer, Gunther Hauser, Gesamtstrategien im Vergleich: Die Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der USA und die Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie, p.13: According to this study the view of the Clinton Administration on unilateral engagement did not differ to much from the view expressed in the Bush doctrine.
[16] Ivo Daalder, America Unbound, p.122
[17] Francois Heisbourg, A Work in
Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences, p.77: "It is difficult
for U.S. partners and allies, and even for an analyst, to equate this classical
approach with the one developed, among others, in Wolfowitz's speech."
[18] Karl-Heinz Kamp, Von der Prävention zur Präemption, Die neue amerikanische Sicherheitsstrategie, p.19
[19] Erich Reiter, Die nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der USA vom September 2002, p.1
[20] Ben Lombardi, The "Bush
Doctrine": Anticipatory Self-Defence and the New US National Security
Strategy, p.104
[21] Erich Reiter, Die nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der USA vom September 2002, p.3
[22] Joachim Krause et al., Wohin gehen die USA? Die neue Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der Bush-Administration, p.45
[23] Erich Reiter, Die nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der USA vom September 2002, p.2
[24] Joachim Krause et al., Wohin gehen die USA? Die neue Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der Bush-Administration, p.40
[25] Karl-Heinz Kamp, Von der Prävention zur Präemption, Die neue amerikanische Sicherheitsstrategie, p.20
[26] National Security Strategy,
introduction, p.I
[27] Joachim Krause et al., Wohin gehen die USA? Die neue Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der Bush-Administration, p.41
[28] National Security Strategy, chapter
I, p.1
[29] Kenneth Stein, Die Bush-Doktrin, Selektives Engagement im Nahen Osten, p.51
[30] Joachim Krause et al., Wohin gehen die USA? Die neue Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der Bush-Administration, p.43
[31] Ben Lombardi, The "Bush
Doctrine": Anticipatory Self-Defence and the New US National Security
Strategy, p.104
[32] Herfried Münkler, Der neue Golfkrieg, p.123
[33] Ben Lombardi, The "Bush
Doctrine": Anticipatory Self-Defence and the New US National Security
Strategy, p.102
[34] Karl-Heinz Kamp, Von der Prävention zur Präemption, Die neue amerikanische Sicherheitsstrategie, p.20
[35] Ivo Daalder, America Unbound, p.13
[36] Ibid., p.3
[37] Colin Powell, A Strategy of
Partnerships, p.25
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid., p.27
[40] Ibid., p.30
[41] Kenneth Stein, Die Bush-Doktrin, Selektives Engagement im Nahen Osten, p.49
[42] Francois Heisbourg, A Work in
Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences, p.76
[43] Ibid., p.79
[44] such a claim is for example put
forward by Karl-Heinz Kamp, Von der Prävention zur Präemption, Die neue
amerikanische Sicherheitsstrategie, p.20: "Auch wurde häufig verkannt,
dass die Autoren des Dokuments wohlweislich Prävention (prevention) und
Präemption (preemption) unterscheiden..."; he does not state where this
distinction is actually drawn in the text.
[45] Francois Heisbourg, A Work in
Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences, p.77
[46] Ibid., p.79
[47] Karl-Heinz Kamp, Von der Prävention zur Präemption, Die neue amerikanische Sicherheitsstrategie, p.20
[48] Colin Powell, A Strategy of
Partnerships, p.25
[49] Ivo Daalder, America Unbound, p.122
[50] Ibid., p.126
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Andrea Riemer, Gunther Hauser, Gesamtstrategien im Vergleich: Die Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der USA und die Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie, p.13-14
[54]Ibid., p.14: "Die am 12.12.2003 beim Gipfel des Europäischen Rates unter italienischem Vorsitz verabschiedete EU-Sicherheitsstrategie unterscheidet sich lediglich in Nuancen von jenem Text, den Javier Solana beim Europäischen Rat im Juni 2003 vorgelegt hatte."
[55] Johann Frank, Gustav Gustenau, Erich Reiter, Anmerkungen zum Entwurf einer Europäischen Sicherheitsstrategie, p.9
[56]Ibid., p.5
[57] Ibid., p.9
[58] Kegley, Wittkopf, World Politics,
p.640
[59] Ibid., p.12
[60] Colin Powell, A Strategy of
Partnerships, p.23
[61] David Gompert, Akteur oder Statist, Die Rolle der Europäischen Union auf der Weltbühne, p.18
[62] Wouters,
Naert, The European Union and ‘September 11’, p.8
[63] Jörg Monar et al., 11 September and
the Challenge of Global Terrorism to the EU as a Security Actor, p.12
[64] Ibid., p.13
[65] Hanspeter Neuhold, Transatlantic
Turbulences: Rifts or Ripples?, p.464
[66] Jörg Monar et al., 11 September and
the Challenge of Global Terrorism to the EU as a Security Actor, p.15
[67] partly after Wouters, Naert, The European Union and ‘September
11’, p.29-33 and Wolfgang Wessels, Security and Defence of the European Union,
pp.22-27
[68] Erich Reiter, Der Kongoeinsatz der EU, p.11
[69] Robert Cooper, Macht und Ohnmacht - aus europäischer Sicht. Eine Antwort auf die Thesen Robert Kagans, p.32
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid., p.36
[73] Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, Fariborz Zelli, Risse im Westen? Betrachtungen zum transatlantischen Verhältnis heute, p.52
[74] International Herald Tribune August 9, 2002
[75] Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, Fariborz Zelli, Risse im Westen? Betrachtungen zum transatlantischen Verhältnis heute, p.34
[76] Gert Krell, Arrogance of Power,
Arrogance of Impotence, pp.26-27
[77] Ibid., p.28; it should be noted
that Kagan also includes some elements of constructivism in his works,
especially when dealing with the phenomenon of European integration
[78] Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness,
p.9
[79] Ibid. p.3
[80] Ibid., p.11
[81] Ibid., p.17
[82] Ibid., p.18
[83] "balancing" means, in
realist terms, the creation of a political and military counterpart
[84] Gert Krell, Arrogance of Power,
Arrogance of Impotence, p.30
[85] Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, Fariborz Zelli, Risse im Westen? Betrachtungen zum transatlantischen Verhältnis heute, p.42
[86] Ibid.
[87] Gert Krell, Arrogance of Power,
Arrogance of Impotence, p.30
[88] Ibid., p.32
[89] Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger, Fariborz Zelli, Risse im Westen? Betrachtungen zum transatlantischen Verhältnis heute, p.43
[90] Ibid.
[91] Ibid., p.44
[92] Gert Krell, Arrogance of Power,
Arrogance of Impotence, p.34
[93] Andrea Riemer, Gunther Hauser, Gesamtstrategien im Vergleich: Die Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der USA und die Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie, p.19
[94] Ibid., p.21: “Bei der Einschätzung der Bedrohungslage sind die National Sicherheitsstrategie und die EU-Sicherheitsstrategie nahezu deckungsgleich.“
[95] National Security Strategy, Chapter
VII, Section "Increase the amount of development assistance that is
provided in the form of grants instead of loans", p.22
[96] National Security Strategy, Chapter
VIII, p.27
[97] Holly Burkhalter, The Politics of
AIDS, p.8
[98] Ibid., p.12
[99] Ibid., p.13
[100] Ibid., p.14
[101] Nicole Gnesotto, Reacting to
America, p.102
[102] Walter Schilling, Europa, Amerika und der Internationale Strafgerichtshof, p.51-56
[103] Hanspeter Neuhold, Transatlantic
Turbulences: Rifts or Ripples?, p.459